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THE JUDICIAL CONTRACTION 
OF SECTION 2 DOCTRINE 
Diana De Leon* 
A critical safeguard of the competitive process, Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits unilateral conduct that results in the 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. The Supreme Court in 
recent years has seemingly continued to defend monopoly  power  as  “an  
important element of the free-market   system,”   but   it   has   failed   to  
provide clear instructions to guide lower courts in their analyses of 
Section 2 claims. This Article examines the state of Section 2 
jurisprudence with an emphasis on lower federal courts, focusing on 
their interpretations of Supreme Court decisions dealing with unilateral 
refusals to deal and price squeezes. In 2003, the Court narrowed the 
scope of Section 2 liability in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, suggesting that monopolists generally 
have no duty to continue dealing with rivals. In the years following the 
decision, lower federal courts have struggled to uniformly interpret and 
apply Trinko in their determinations of what conduct is unlawfully 
predatory or exclusionary under Section 2. Additionally, it has become 
clear  that  lower  federal  courts  have  adopted  the  Court’s  desire  to  avoid  
overdeterrence, as their constructions have ultimately made it more 
difficult for private plaintiffs to win monopolization cases against 
dominant firms. This Article urges antitrust courts to adapt to a 
changing global economic climate and, in doing so, proposes four 
avenues for reform that range from theoretical to practical. In light of 
shrinking enforcement efforts and the increasing obstacles faced by 
private plaintiffs in federal courts, fundamental change is necessary to 
protect competition and consumers. 
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Review for their contribution to this Article. I will be forever grateful to Professor Daniel Lazaroff 
and my devoted editor, Edith Nazarian, for their expertise and guidance. Most importantly, I wish 
to thank my family and friends for their unwavering support and encouragement. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, San Francisco State University Professor Ralph 
Anspach sold two hundred thousand copies of his newly invented 
board   game,   “Anti-Monopoly.”1 Disgruntled by his fruitless search 
for a board game that plainly depicted the concept of monopoly in a 
harsher light, Professor Anspach crafted the “prankish antithesis to 
the Monopoly game,”2 in which players could compete as 
trustbusters to break up monopolies existing at the start of the game.3 
In that same year, President Gerald Ford signed into law the Antitrust 
Procedures and Penalties Act,4 which marked a significant 
toughening of the nation’s antitrust laws. The act punished violators 
of the Sherman Act5 much more stringently: it upgraded an antitrust 
offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, raised the maximum prison 
sentence from one year to three years, and increased monetary fines 
from $50,000 to $1 million for corporations and from $50,000 to 
$100,000 for individuals.6 Upon signing the bill, President Ford 
 
 1. Mary Pilon, How a Fight  over  a  Board  Game  Monopolized  an  Economist’s  Life, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 20, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB125599860004295449.html. 
 2. Burton H. Wolfe, Anti-Monopoly, WASH. FREE PRESS, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 1, available 
at http://wafreepress.org/36/monopoly.html. 
 3. Pilon, supra note 1; see Doug Collins, Go to Court, Go Directly to Court, WASH. FREE 
PRESS, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 1, available at http://wafreepress.org/36/court.html; How to Play, 
ANTI-MONOPOLY (1999), http://antimonopoly.com/how-anti-monopoly-plays (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2012). Interestingly,  in  1997,  Anspach’s  Anti-Monopoly, Inc. (“AMI”) filed an antitrust 
action against Hasbro, the game-manufacturing giant and parent company of Monopoly creator 
Parker Brothers. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 
130 F.3d 1101 (2d Cir. 1997). AMI alleged that Parker Brothers engaged in monopolization in the 
form of discriminatory pricing by giving discounts and promotions to mass retailers, which 
discouraged those retailers from selling non-Hasbro games, thereby injuring competition. Id. at 
900. Ultimately, the district  court  granted  Hasbro’s  motion  for  summary   judgment,   finding   that  
AMI  failed  to  prove  that  Hasbro’s  market  share  accurately  reflected  its  market  power  and  failed  
to present sufficient evidence to support its discriminatory pricing claims. Id. at 904, 906–07. 
 4. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), 
available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OSEC/library/legislative_histories/1625.pdf. 
 5. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
 6. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708 
(1974). Since 1974, Congress has augmented the maximum prison sentence to ten years and the 
maximum monetary penalties to $100 million for a corporation and $1 million for an individual. 
Sherman Act § 2. While this Article focuses primarily on Section 2 enforcement in private civil 
cases,  the  increased  penalties  and  fines  illustrate  the  government’s  broader  willingness  to  take  a  
tough stance on monopoly violations. Notably, however, there has been an absence of criminal 
enforcement under Section 2. William F. Adkinson, Jr. et al., Enforcement of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act: Theory and Practice 6 n.30 (Nov. 3, 2008) (unpublished working paper), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/section2overview.pdf. 
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highlighted the necessity of strengthening antitrust laws, stating, 
“The time is long overdue for making violations of the Sherman Act 
a serious crime, because of the extremely adverse effect which they 
have on the country and its economy . . . . In times like these, we 
cannot afford to do less.”7 
While Professor Anspach’s impassioned quest to market a game 
depicting the darker consequences of monopoly differs markedly 
from President Ford’s advancement of antitrust reform as but a piece 
of broader efforts to spur the economy,8 both men understood the 
fundamental purpose of antitrust law and recognized that 
monopolizing companies ought to be reined in.9 Nearly a quarter 
century later, in the midst of a grave economic downturn, then-
Senator Barack Obama similarly pledged to “take seriously [the] 
responsibility to enforce the antitrust laws so that all Americans 
benefit from a growing and healthy competitive free-market 
economy.”10 However, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions 
that have severely narrowed the scope of liability for violations of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, it appears that the Obama 
Administration’s promised enforcement efforts in the realm of 
 
 7. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 317 PUB. 
PAPERS 772 (Dec. 23, 1974). During this period, President Ford faced a recession and heightened 
anxiety over soaring inflation and unemployment rates, not unlike current concerns about the 
economic climate. Compare Inflation:  Ford’s  Plan:   (Mostly)  Modest  Proposals, TIME, Oct. 14, 
1974, at 39, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908847,00.html 
(discussing the recession and soaring inflation and unemployment in 1974), with Alister Bull, 
U.S. Job Losses Worst Since 1974 as Downturn Deepens, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2008, 5:22 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/06/us-usa-economy-jobs-idUSTRE4B437520081205 
(discussing the recession and soaring unemployment in 2008). 
 8. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, supra note 
7 (noting that the increased antitrust penalties in the senate bill would help to lower inflation). 
 9. It should be noted that the central focus of this Article is on the federal judiciary, which, 
unlike President Ford or Professor Anspach, has strongly cautioned in recent years against taking 
affirmative steps to curb monopolization. See infra Parts III, IV, V. This Article goes a step 
further to suggest that recent Supreme Court decisions have further muddied the already-clouded 
waters of Section 2 jurisprudence to the detriment of competition and consumers. 
 10. Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust 
Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential 
%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf. Then-Senator Obama additionally 
criticized   the  Bush  Administration  for  possessing  “what  may  be   the  weakest   record  of  antitrust  
enforcement of any administration   in   the   last   half   century,”   highlighting   the   administration’s  
failure to bring a single monopolization case in seven years. Id. at 1. 
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Section 2 monopoly cases have amounted more to rhetoric than to 
realization.11 
From its inception in 1890, through the 1970s, and still today, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act has served to promote a market-based 
economy that increases growth, maximizes societal wealth, and 
protects the public from market failures stemming from stagnated 
competition.12 As a critical safeguard of the competitive process, 
Section 2 specifically prohibits unilateral conduct that results in the 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power: “Every person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony.”13 Over time, and particularly in the last 
decade, the Supreme Court has severely narrowed the range of 
conduct targeted by the act, leaving a great deal of uncertainty and 
inconsistency in the lower federal courts.14 Not long after President 
Ford’s address, a period of “heartfelt and aggressive [Section] 2 
jurisprudence came to an end” as both policy makers and courts 
altered procedural rules in ways that limited private enforcement.15 
This trend continued into the new millennium as the Supreme Court 
reversed nine straight antitrust cases in which lower federal courts 
had found that defendant-monopolists had violated the Sherman 
Act.16 
 
 11. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 12. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 12 (2008); see Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 
506  U.S.  447,  458  (1985)  (asserting  that  the  purpose  of  the  Sherman  Act  is  “to  protect  the  public  
from   the   failure   of   the   market”);;   United   States   v.   Colgate   &   Co.,   250   U.S.   300,   307 (1919) 
(declaring  that  the  purpose  of  the  Sherman  Act  is  “to  preserve  the  right  of  freedom  to  trade”). 
 13. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Section 2 additionally reaches concerted action, see 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.13 (1984), but this Article 
focuses solely on unilateral Section 2 conduct. 
 14. John DeQ. Briggs & Daniel J. Matheson, The  Supreme  Court’s  21st  Century  Section  2  
Jurisprudence: Penelope or Thermopylae?, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 137, 139 (2010). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Pac. Bell Tel. Co.  v.  Linkline  Commc’ns,  Inc.,  555  U.S.  438  (2009)  (finding  no  Section 
2  violation,  as  plaintiff’s  price-squeeze claim was not cognizable under the Sherman Act); Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (finding no Section 1 violation); 
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S 264 (2007) (holding that there can be no 
antitrust liability where application of antitrust laws is clearly incompatible with securities law); 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that the Section 1 complaint should be 
dismissed if it merely alleges parallel conduct and conspiracy without more explicative facts); 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (rejecting 
Section 2 predatory bidding claim); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) 
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Boundless technological advances, fast-paced globalization, and 
new agglomerations of wealth have irrevocably changed the way the 
world does business.17 Arguably, the perspectives on antitrust 
liability in federal courts have changed just as dramatically.18 While 
the recent economic crisis might signal that “market-based 
economies are neither as efficient nor self-correcting” as 
policymakers once touted,19 the Supreme Court in recent years has 
continued to defend monopoly power as a critical part of the free-
market system20 but has failed to provide clear instructions to guide 
lower federal courts in their analyses. In the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s prodefendant decisions, district and circuit courts have been 
left with fragmented guidelines on the definition of predatory or 
exclusionary behavior prohibited by Section 2.21 In this uncertain 
framework, how has the Supreme Court’s approach to Section 2 
taken root in lower federal courts? 
This Article examines the state of Section 2 jurisprudence with 
an emphasis on lower federal courts, focusing on their interpretations 
of Supreme Court decisions and how those constructions may 
illuminate or obstruct future paths of decision-making or reform. Part 
II begins with a general overview of Section 2’s scope and sets forth 
 
(finding that a tying arrangement did not violate Section 1); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 
(2006) (finding that a horizontal price-fixing agreement was not a per se violation of Section 1); 
Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (finding no antitrust 
violation under Robinson-Patman   Act);;   Verizon   Commc’ns   Inc.   v.   Law   Offices   of   Curtis   V.  
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding that a unilateral refusal to deal did not violate Section 
2); see Daniel R. Shulman, Refusals to Deal: Is Anything Left; Should There Be?, 11 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 95, 110 (2010). 
 17. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33–34 (1992) (describing formidable changes in the structure of 
the economy and rise of huge firms). 
 18. Compare United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (declaring that 
the   Sherman   Act   is   “the   Magna   Carta   of   free   enterprise”   and is as important to economic 
freedoms  “as  the  Bill  of  Rights  is  to  the  protection  of  our  fundamental  personal  freedoms”),  with 
Credit Suisse Sec., 551 U.S. at 282 (asserting that courts will likely make grave mistakes in 
evaluating antitrust claims, resulting in inconsistent outcomes). 
 19. See Briggs & Matheson, supra note 14, at 160; Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role 
of Antitrust in Distressed Industries, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 277,   281   (2010)   (“[A]ntitrust has so 
narrowed the focus of its discipline that it has chosen to ignore larger issues, contributing to 
larger scale consumer harm.”). 
 20. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. 
 21. See Carl Hittinger & Jarod Bona, Supreme Court Decisions Weaken Antitrust Laws, 
EXECUTIVE COUNS., Mar./Apr. 2008, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/ 
Executive_Counsel_Reprint_MarApr08.pdf. 
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the accepted two-part test for actual monopolization. Part II.A 
discusses the first requirement of monopoly power, while Part II.B 
describes the second requirement of exclusionary or predatory 
conduct and explores the difficulties that courts face in determining 
what kinds of unilateral conduct violate Section 2. 
Next, Parts III and IV examine the impact of recent Supreme 
Court decisions on lower courts, arguing that the Supreme Court has 
succeeded in making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win 
monopolization cases against dominant firms. Specifically, Part III.A 
centers on refusals to deal, illustrating how the Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko22 has significantly narrowed the scope of Section 2 
liability, and Part III.B examines the differing lessons lower federal 
courts have extrapolated from the Trinko Court’s famously nebulous 
decision. Part IV.A explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc.,23 and 
Part IV.B describes how various Section 2 claims of predatory 
pricing have fared in lower federal courts after Linkline, highlighting 
the ways in which plaintiffs have restructured their Section 2 claims 
to survive dismissal. 
Part V examines the state of attempted monopolization claims, 
noting that, after the Court’s holding in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,24 it is now increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to survive 
motions to dismiss.25 Part VI assesses enforcement efforts under the 
Obama Administration, noting that its rejuvenated enforcement 
efforts have amounted to more rhetoric than action in the realm of 
Section 2. Part VII then urges federal courts deciding antitrust cases 
to adapt to a changing economic climate. In doing so, it considers 
radically eliminating the market-definition process, advances a novel 
judicial approach to Section 2 claims that aims to reduce the risk of 
false positives, explores the viability of pursuing monopolization 
 
 22. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 23. 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
 24. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 25. While this Article focuses exclusively on Twombly’s  effect  on  attempted  monopolization  
claims, Twombly’s  impact  reaches  all  antitrust  claims,  including  actual  monopolization.  See Mark 
Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2010). 
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claims under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,26 and 
proposes that courts broaden the scope of Section 2 liability. The 
Article concludes in Part VIII by suggesting that fundamental change 
is both necessary and possible. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT: 
ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF SECTION 2 
In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,27 the 
Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history influencing the 
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.28 It determined that the new 
antitrust laws were “required by the economic condition of the 
times,” referring to the rise of powerful and profitable corporations 
and the steady proliferation of trusts.29 Compounded with the 
widespread impression that corporate power would continue to 
“oppress individuals and injure the public,”30 these conditions 
motivated the United States Congress to pass the Sherman Act to 
encourage vigorous competition as a way to diffuse concentrations of 
economic power, open access to markets and consumers, and 
generate efficiencies.31 Section 2 of the Sherman Act attempts to 
achieve these goals by stating, “Every person who shall monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony.”32 
 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
 27. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 28. Id. at 50. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. 59, 
68–69 (2010). 
 32. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). For a discussion of actual monopolization, see infra 
Parts II.B–C, III.A–B. For a discussion of attempted monopolization, see infra Parts II.D, III.C. 
Conspiracy to monopolize will not be a point of discussion in this Article. As the First Circuit 
commented in Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C.,  “[c]onspiracy to monopolize claims are 
not often the subject of much attention, since almost any such claim could be proved more easily 
under  section  1’s  ban  on  conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade.”  284  F.3d 47, 67 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 809 (3d ed. 1996)); see Sherman Act § 1   (“Every  
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce  among  the  several  States,  or  with  foreign  nations,  is  declared  to  be  illegal.”). 
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Courts have continually emphasized that the Sherman Act exists 
to prevent harm to the competitive process, not to protect individual 
competitors from harm.33 While Section 1 of the Sherman Act is 
directed at concerted action and agreements between parties that 
unreasonably restrain trade, Section 2 reaches the independent, 
unilateral actions of single firms that have the effect of creating or 
maintaining a monopoly.34 The broad judicial consensus indicates 
that the Section 2 offense of actual monopolization is twofold: first, a 
single firm must possess monopoly power or be likely to achieve it,35 
and second, it must engage in predatory or exclusionary conduct.36 
A.  Measuring Monopoly Power 
Since the 1940s, courts hearing antitrust issues have largely 
remained loyal to the test articulated by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Grinnell Corp.37 to determine actual monopolization.38 
First, plaintiffs must identify the relevant market,39 which refers to 
both the relevant geographic and product markets.40 Defining the 
relevant geographic market requires identifying “the area or areas to 
 
 33. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993); Appleton v. 
Intergraph Corp., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1357 (M.D. Ga. 2008) (dismissing a Section 2 claim 
because  defendant’s  conduct  only  harmed  plaintiff  and  not  competition  in  general). 
 34. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
 35. See id. at 767–68 (“In   part   because   it   is   sometimes difficult to distinguish robust 
competition from conduct with long-run anti-competitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman 
Act  scrutiny  of  single  firms  only  when  they  pose  a  danger  of  monopolization.”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 5. 
 36. See Verizon  Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices  of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.  398,  407  
(2004) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)). Although this formulation is 
frequently a fixture in contemporary antitrust cases, it is often criticized as too vague. See, e.g., 
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 255 (2003) 
(describing  the  test  as  “not just  vague  but  vacuous”). 
 37. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
 38. E.g.,   Pac.   Bell   Tel.   Co.   v.   Linkline   Commc’ns,   Inc.,   555   U.S.   438,   447–48 (2009); 
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407; see SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, MONOPOLIZATION 
AND DOMINANCE HANDBOOK 101 [hereinafter MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK] (characterizing 
the Grinnell rule  as  “[w]idely  cited”). 
 39. This inquiry is fact-intensive and focuses on commercial realities and the existence of 
product or service alternatives. See MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 66. 
 40. See id. at 67; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at  27  (finding  that  “market  
definition remains an important aspect of section 2 enforcement and that continued consideration 
and study is warranted regarding how to appropriately determine relevant markets in this 
context”). But cf. Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 438 
(2010)  (advancing  the  claim  that  “the  market  definition  process  is  incoherent  as  a  matter  of  basic  
economic principles and hence should be abandoned  entirely”). 
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which a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services 
that he seeks.”41 The relevant product market includes “products that 
have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they 
are producedprice, use and qualities considered.”42 
Once the relevant market is established, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the defendant-monopolist possesses monopoly 
power in the relevant market.43 Courts have often used the terms 
“market power” and “monopoly power” interchangeably,44 as both 
refer to “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”45 On 
the rare occasion that legitimate direct evidence of monopoly power 
exists that clearly evinces the ability to exclude competitors, courts 
will find that a plaintiff has established the existence of monopoly 
power.46 However, in most instances, courts will need to find 
circumstantial evidence of monopoly power.47 Indirect indicia of 
monopoly power include the defendant’s share of the market,48 entry 
barriers to the market,49 the existence of excess capacity, and 
 
 41. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 588 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 42. Brown  Shoe  Co.  v.  United  States,  370  U.S.  294,  324  (1962)   (“[T]he  ‘area  of  effective  
competition’  must  be  determined  by  reference  to  a  product  market  (the  ‘line  of  commerce’)  and  a 
geographic  market  (the  ‘section  of  the  country’).”);;  United  States  v.  E.  I.  du  Pont  de  Nemours  &  
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956); MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 67–75. 
Although it is well established that the starting point for defining the relevant market includes 
inquiries into both geographic and product markets, courts have neither settled on a single method 
to determine the relevant geographic market nor determined the degree of substitutability of a 
product necessary to qualify that product as part of the relevant market. MONOPOLIZATION 
HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 67, 69, 74–75. 
 43. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71. 
 44. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 63. 
 45. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 391; MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra 
note 38, at 62–63. But see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 
(1992) (stating without further clarification that “monopoly  power  under  §  2  requires,  of  course,  
something  greater  than  market  power  under  §  1”); In re Payment Card Litigation, 562 F. Supp. 2d 
392, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (asserting that “market  share  and  monopoly  power  are  not   the   same  
thing;;  the  former  is  merely  evidence  of  the  latter”). 
 46. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 64–65. 
 47. Id. at 64–65. 
 48. United   States   v.   Dentsply   Int’l,   Inc.,   399   F.3d   181,   187   (3d   Cir.   2005);;   Harold   R.  
Weinberg, Is the Monopoly Theory of Trademarks Robust or a Bust?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 
146   (2005)   (“A   rough   proxy   for   a   firm’s  monopoly   power   is   its  market   share:   the   greater   the  
market  share,  the  greater  the  power,  and  vice  versa.”). 
 49. Entry barriers exist where existing or potential rivals are discouraged from competing 
with  a  single  firm’s  supracompetitive  pricing.  United  States  v.  Microsoft  Corp.,  253  F.3d  34,  51  
(D.C.   Cir.   2001)   (per   curiam).   Other   examples   include   “regulatory   requirements,   large   capital  
costs, control of natural supplies, intellectual-property ownership,  and  network  effects.”  Bonny  E.  
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monopsony power.50 Market share over 70 percent typically supports 
an inference of monopoly power, while “a gray area between 
approximately 50 and 70 percent market share . . . [requires] 
additional evidence [to] substantiate monopoly power.”51 Entry 
barriers to the relevant market are particularly critical in this 
analysis. For example, courts may find that a single firm dominating 
100 percent of a market with very low entry barriers lacks monopoly 
power.52 Equally, a single firm with a lower market share may be 
found to possess monopoly power where entry barriers to the market 
are high.53 Thus, while a single firm’s market share may be an 
indicator of its monopoly power, courts must consider barriers to 
entry in determining whether a single firm in fact possesses 
monopoly power.54 
B.  Detecting Monopolizing Conduct 
Once monopoly power is established, the second prong of the 
test for actual monopolization requires the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the defendant willfully acquired or maintained that power 
through monopolizing conductnamely, predatory or exclusionary 
actions that unlawfully allow a firm to gain or extend monopoly 
 
Sweeney, An Overview of Section 2 Enforcement and Developments, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 231, 236 
(2008). 
 50. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38,   at   65.   “Monopsony   power   is   market  
power  on  the  buy  side  of  the  market,”  where  a  powerful  buyer  purchases  an  excess  of  a  particular  
input, thereby driving up the price of that input for competitors. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 320 (2007); MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, 
supra note 38, at 200. 
 51. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 76–77; e.g., United States v. E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 379, 379, 391 (1956) (finding 75 percent to be sufficient); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding 90 percent to 
be  “enough  to  constitute  a  monopoly”  but  33  percent  to  be  insufficient). 
 52. See Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding 
possession of 70 percent market insufficient to establish a monopoly because the rival 
successfully entered the market); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 
1208  (9th  Cir.  1997)  (“Even  a  100%  monopolist  may  not  exploit  its  monopoly  power  in  a  market  
without   entry   barriers.”);;   Daniel   E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust 
Litigation, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1,  21  (2006)  (“Theoretically,  if  barriers  to  entry  do  not  exist,  
no  antitrust  violations  for  which  market  power  is  a  critical  component  would  be  established.”). 
 53. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1207 (noting that lower market share 
demonstrates  market  power  “if  entry  barriers  are  high  and  competitors  are  unable  to  expand  their  
output  in  response  to  supracompetitive  pricing”  (quoting  Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 
F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995))). 
 54. See Lazaroff, supra note 52. 
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power, “as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”55 In other words, Section 2 does not condemn the mere 
possession of a monopoly: it in fact permits a single firm to acquire 
or maintain monopoly power by, for example, lawfully crafting a 
preferable good or service, implementing innovative business 
strategies, or seizing open opportunities in a new market.56 As the 
Supreme Court emphasized in its 2004 landmark decision in Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, “[t]o 
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly 
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an 
element of anticompetitive conduct.”57 
Herein lies the rub: at what point does this encouraged 
competitive behavior become unlawfully exclusionary? By virtue of 
the statute’s brevity, the critical task of defining the offense of 
“monopolization,” and essentially molding the contours of Section 2, 
has fallen to federal courts.58 The problem is that courts have 
traditionally been unable, or unwilling, to define what constitutes 
 
 55. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 56. See MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 87–88. Under Section 2, a lawful 
monopolist may exploit the benefits of monopoly power “as  a  consequence  of  a  superior  product,  
business  acumen,  or  historic  accident” under the belief that consumer interests are best protected 
by preserving the dynamic competition that occurs as firms struggle for monopoly profits. Id. at 
2, 87–89; see Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71; Aluminum Co. of America,   148  F.2d  at  430  (“The  
successful competitor, having  been  urged  to  compete,  must  not  be  turned  upon  when  he  wins.”).  
This competitive process generates desirable increased efficiencies, such as product development, 
lower retail prices, higher output, and higher quality products. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, 
supra note 38, at 102. 
 57. 540  U.S.   398,   407   (2004).   Indeed,   in   upholding   a  monopolist’s   refusal   to   deal  with   a  
rival as lawful, the Trinko Court   recognized   that   “[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly 
pricesat least for a short periodis  what  attracts  ‘business  acumen’  in  the  first  place;;  it  induces  
risk   taking   that   produces   innovation   and   economic   growth.”   Id. But see J. Thomas Rosch, 
Comm’r,  Fed.  Trade  Comm’n,  Remarks Before the LECG Newport Summit on Antitrust Law & 
Economics,  Wading   into   Pandora’s   Box:   Thoughts   on   Unanswered   Questions   Concerning   the  
Scope and Application of Section 2 and Some Further Observations on Section 5, at 5 (Oct. 3, 
2009) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/091003roschleegspeech.pdf) 
(“[W]hile  it  is  true  that  anticipated  financial  rewards  certainly  drive  innovation  and  competition,  
the observation that monopolies incentivize the monopolist to engage in innovation is 
meaningless in the Section 2 context so long as it is divorced from the effects that monopolies 
have  on  rivals.”). 
 58. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 
(asserting that antitrust courts are entrusted with the task   of   divining   “a   general   rule   for  
distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, 
which  increase  it”). 
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predatory or exclusionary behavior that violates Section 2.59 
Unfortunately, unlike chemical toxicity or pollution emissions, 
which can be measured using accurate and widely accepted scientific 
devices and mathematic formulae,60 anticompetitive effects resulting 
from particular acts are not directly measurable.61 As one 
commentator noted, judges and juries find it nearly impossible to 
concretely define monopolization, but they “know it when they see 
it.”62 
Bright-line rules of conduct have had little place in Section 2 
jurisprudence because, quite simply, it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish procompetitive behavior from exclusionary behavior in 
many instances.63 Oftentimes a firm’s routine conductwhether it 
be pricing or nonpricing behaviorcan appear to both harm the 
competitive process and generate efficiencies at the same time. For 
example, exclusive supply contracts may enhance consumer welfare 
by assuring supply, affording protection against rises in price, and 
eliminating costs associated with short-term planning; on the other 
hand, exclusive dealings can cause material harm to excluded 
competitors whose products are not sold or promoted by retailers or 
distributors bound by such contracts.64 In the context of refusals to 
deal, a monopolist can both benefit from its general freedom to 
conduct business with whom it pleases and suffer legal sanctions by 
 
 59. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12,   at  13   (“[D]istinguishing   between   vigorous  
competition by a firm with substantial market power and illegitimate forms of conduct is one of 
the most challenging puzzles for courts, enforcers, and  antitrust  practitioners.”). 
 60. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency has a national vehicle and fuel 
emissions laboratory whose emissions tests are replicated by many other corporations. Testing 
and Measuring Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/nvfel/testing/ 
index.htm (last updated Apr. 29, 2010). 
 61. See Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 31, at 77 (noting that courts must examine 
“‘anticompetitive’  conduct  remains  disturbingly  ill-defined”  and  questioning  the  extent  to  which  
“increased  prices,  diminished  supply,  or  lower  quality”  to  illustrate  an  anticompetitive  impact  on  
the competitive process). 
 62. Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 1623, 1624 (2005) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (describing one method to detect obscenity)). 
 63. See Microsoft Corp.,  253  F.3d  at  58  (“[T]he  means  of  illicit exclusion, like the means of 
legitimate  competition,  are  myriad.”);;  Alan  Devlin  &  Michael  Jacobs,  Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 75,  88  (2010)  (observing  that  “the  line  between [beneficial] novel conduct . . . and 
its harmful counterpart is so  thin  as  to  be  invisible”). 
 64. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 166–67. 
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unlawfully denying a competitor access to a particular resource.65 In 
the context of single-product pricing, strategically cutting prices 
undoubtedly benefits consumers in the short run, but in the long run, 
a monopolist’s predatory pricing strategy may spur a mass exodus 
from a competitive market by wrongfully misleading rivals and new 
entrants about the future viability of participating in that market.66 
Thus, courts must carefully handle the sensitive balance inherent in 
any analysis of single firm behavior and recognize the danger posed 
by concrete rules that might chill future procompetitive conduct.67 
In declining to impose Section 2 liability, the Supreme Court in 
Trinko firmly articulated the constraints that echo throughout recent 
decisions, and it revealed its reluctance to make more sweeping 
pronouncements about the scope of permissible single-firm 
behavior.68 First, the danger of false positives “counsels against an 
undue expansion of § 2 liability.”69 False positives refer to the 
wrongful condemnation of conduct that actually benefits competition 
and consumers, as well as the loss of procompetitive acts by firms 
that are deterred from undertaking such conduct by fear of 
litigation.70 The risk of inadvertently penalizing beneficial 
 
 65. E.g., Verizon  Commc’ns   Inc.   v.  Law  Offices   of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.  398  
(2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); see infra Parts 
II.B, III.A. In a famous early example of what the Court deemed an unlawful refusal to deal, a 
newspaper publisher that enjoyed a monopoly on the dissemination of local news refused to deal 
with advertisers who also placed ads with a radio station that the newspaper publisher perceived 
to be a rival. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). The Court was willing 
to find a Section 2 violation because the newspaper publisher used its monopoly power to 
essentially foreclose competition in the advertising market. Id. at 155. 
 66. Typically,   a  plaintiff   can   demonstrate   predatory   pricing   by   proving   a  monopolist’s   (1)  
below-cost pricing and (2) a dangerous probability of recouping losses after having driven rivals 
from the market. E.g., Pac. Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Linkline  Commc’ns,  Inc.,  555  U.S.  438,  444  (2009);;  
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993); see infra 
Parts II.C, III.B. The Supreme Court has yet to announce what measure of cost should be used to 
determine  whether  prices  are  “below  cost,” although commentators have suggested average total 
cost and average variable cost. MICHAEL L. DENGER ET AL., Predatory Pricing and Practices, in 
ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR 2009: DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING, at 276–79 (PLI 
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 18749, 2009). 
 67. See Trinko,  450  U.S.  at  414  (“Mistaken  inferences  and  the  resulting  false  condemnations  
‘are   especially   costly,   because   they   chill   the   very   conduct   the   antitrust   laws   are   designed   to 
protect.’”   (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 
(1986))); MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 112. 
 68. See Linkline, 555 U.S. at 452–53; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325 (2007); Trinko, 450 U.S. at 414. 
 69. Trinko, 450 U.S. at 414. 
 70. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 16. 
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competitive conduct is magnified when one considers stare decisis: if 
a court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, any other firm that 
uses the condemned practice faces the possibility of sanctions as 
well.71 In the context of antitrust cases, courts have adhered to 
precedents established by earlier decisions in acknowledging that the 
Sherman Act is a common-law statute, which “adapts to modern 
understanding and greater experience . . . .”72 In 2007, the Court in 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,73 a Section 1 
case, observed that “the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of 
trade’ evolve[s] to meet the dynamics of present economic 
conditions.”74 In light of stare decisis, false positives can chill the 
very conduct that the antitrust laws are designed to protect.75 
Second, the Trinko Court evinced a deep distaste for placing 
antitrust courts in the role of “central planners,” who must “identify 
proper prices, quantity, and other terms of dealing . . . .”76 Not only 
would this role impose a greater strain on judicial resources, but, 
according to the Court three years later in Credit Suisse Securities 
LLC v. Billing,77 it would also increase the likelihood that courts 
would make unusually serious mistakes in evaluating the evidentiary 
nuances intrinsic to antitrust challenges.78 The Trinko Court further 
 
 71. See id. at  17  (asserting  that  “stare decisis inhibits courts from routinely correcting errors 
or  updating  the  law  to  reflect  the  latest  advances  in  economic  thinking”  (emphasis  added)). 
 72. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887, 899 (2007); see Ill. 
Brick  Co.  v.  Illinois,  431  U.S.  720,  736  (1977)  (“[W]e  must  bear  in  mind  that  considerations  of  
stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change 
this  Court’s  interpretation  of  its  legislation.”). 
 73. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 74. Id. at 899. 
 75. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986). But see 
Peter C. Carstensen, False Positives in Identifying Liability for Exclusionary Conduct: 
Conceptual Error, Business Reality, and Aspen, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 295, 296 (2008) (arguing that 
fear of false positives is ultimately incompatible with the needs of a market economy). 
 76. See Verizon  Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004).  The  Court  emphasized  that  even  if  the  problem  of  false  positives  did  not  exist,  “no  court  
should  impose  a  duty  to  deal  that  it  cannot  explain  or  adequately  and  reasonably  supervise.”  Id. at 
415 (citing Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)). 
 77. 551 U.S. 264, 282 (2007). While Credit Suisse involved regulated securities markets, the 
Court’s  comment  “resonates  with  all  critics of antitrust, class actions, treble damages, the lack of 
contribution  and  the  American  antirust  [sic]  regime  in  general.”  Briggs  &  Matheson,  supra note 
14, at 140. 
 78. But see Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, 
and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 917–18 (2000) 
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emphasized that judges do not have carte blanche to insist that 
dominant single firms change their ways of doing business whenever 
another approach might generate greater competition.79 To many 
commentators, Trinko represented a probusiness decision that 
dramatically narrowed the scope of Section 2 liability with drastic 
consequences.80 However the decision is characterized, the Court 
made clear its acute awareness of the dangers of overdeterrence.81 
Combined with the possibility of treble damages and class action 
suits,82 false positives appear to present a potent threat to the 
competitive process, which has effectively impeded any judicial 
expansion of Section 2 liability. 
With these concerns in mind, how can courts best determine 
what behavior is predatory or exclusionary? Because many types of 
conduct straddle the line between procompetitive and predatory, 
courts have yet to endorse an all-purpose legal test.83 Within this 
second prong, courts have historically struggled to arrive at a 
consensus as to which legal tests appropriately and adequately detect 
different forms of monopolistic behavior.84 For example, in the early 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States85 appeared to rely on the defendant oil 
refinery’s growth to show illegal intent to monopolize.86 Noting that 
Standard Oil’s massive expansion “necessarily involved the intent to 
 
(observing that courts have become more sophisticated with antitrust analysis and have become 
more receptive to economic arguments). 
 79. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415–16 (additionally noting that there is no duty to aid 
competitors). 
 80. See James A. Keyte, The Ripple Effects of Trinko: How It Is Affecting Section 2 
Analysis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2005, at 44, 46; Shulman, supra note 16. But see Thomas A. Lambert, 
The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 871, 873–74 (2011). 
 81. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414. 
 82. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 15. 
 83. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 93–94 
(2007) (finding in Recommendation 12 that no consensus exists that any one test can suffice to 
assess all types of conduct that may be challenged under Section 2); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining 
Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying 
Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435,  437   (2006)   (“[T]he   few  clear   guideposts   in  Section  2  
case law demonstrate that courts properly apply different Section 2 legal tests to different 
conduct.”). 
 84. See MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 110 (observing that the consensus 
that consumer welfare is the touchstone of Section 2 enforcement has not led to a consensus on 
how the courts should identify and detect monopolizing behavior). 
 85. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 86. See id. at 75–79. 
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drive others from the field and to exclude them from their right to 
trade,” the Court affirmed that Standard Oil unlawfully attempted to 
perpetuate an “unreasonable” monopoly.87 Toward the middle of the 
century, courts increasingly began to find Section 2 liability based on 
evidence of market structure as a vehicle for improper conduct, 
combined with unusually high levels of returnthat is, where a 
monopolist clearly possessed significant market power, courts more 
readily found violations of Section 2 where there was minimal 
questionable conduct.88 Another formulation by the Court in United 
States v. Griffith,89 decided in 1948, established that the second 
element of a Section 2 claim is the use of monopoly power, however 
lawfully acquired, “to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive 
advantage, or to destroy a competitor.”90 Although Griffith remains 
good law, modern courts would not likely find a monopolist’s simple 
pursuit of a competitive advantage to be unlawful. 
In contrast, today’s current emphasis on consumer welfare, the 
danger of false positives, and courts’ susceptibility to that danger 
have spurred myriad solutions addressing different types of Section 2 
claims.91 Proposed standards for evaluating unilateral conduct under 
Section 2 include, but are not limited to, the “no economic sense” 
test,92 the profit-sacrifice test,93 and the “equally efficient rival” 
 
 87. See id. at 76, 79. 
 88. See Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 31, at 71; see, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d  per  
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
 89. 334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
 90. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482–83 (1992) 
(citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)). 
 91. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 83, at 88 (noting in 
Recommendation 12 that  “the  Supreme  Court  has  now  adopted  and   is   applying   legal   standards  
and rules for Section 2 that are more sensitive to the possible efficiencies of business conduct and 
more attuned to the potential for consumer harm from overly stringent application of Section 2 
standards . . . .”). 
 92. The   “no   economic   sense”   test   examines   whether   the   challenged   conduct   would   have  
been economically rational even if it did not reduce or eliminate competition. See Gregory J. 
Werden, The  “No  Economic  Sense”  Test  for  Exclusionary  Conduct, 31 J. CORP. L. 293 (2006). 
 93. Like   the   “no   economic   sense”   test,   the   “profit-sacrifice   test”   examines   whether the 
profitability of a strategy that sacrifices immediate profits depends on recoupment of losses by 
excluding competitors. See Elhauge, supra note 36, at 255. However, as one commentator pointed 
out, the profit-sacrifice test falls short because undesirable conduct that normally excludes rivals 
requires no sacrifice of short-run profits. Id. 
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test.94 This “dizzying array of tests,” designed to distinguish between 
procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct, may actually “serve to 
entrench rather than to expose the deficient legal foundation of 
contemporary section 2 doctrine.”95 In recent years, the use of the 
“rule of reason” test, seemingly borrowed from analyses of Section 1 
claims, has gathered momentum in Section 2 cases, where courts 
essentially balance the effects of the alleged anticompetitive behavior 
against a monopolist’s procompetitive justifications.96 More 
specifically, under the “rule of reason” test as presented in United 
States v. Microsoft Corp.,97 the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to 
first demonstrate that the alleged monopolist’s act has an 
“anticompetitive effect.”98 Next, if the “plaintiff successfully 
establishes a prima facie case under [Section] 2 by demonstrating an 
anticompetitive effect,” the burden shifts to the defendant-
monopolist to “proffer a procompetitive justification for its conduct” 
to illustrate that the conduct constitutes competition on the merits.99 
Finally, the plaintiff will prevail on the claim if the plaintiff can then 
rebut the defendant’s claim by showing that the anticompetitive harm 
outweighs the procompetitive benefit.100 
The Antitrust Modernization Commission has emphasized that 
legal tests to determine the existence of violations must be 
straightforward, administrable, and crafted to reduce the possibility 
 
 94. Under   the   “equally   efficient   rival”   test,   a   plaintiff   must   prove   that   the   defendant’s  
challenged conduct is likely to exclude an equally or more efficient competitor from the market. 
The defendant must rebut this assertion by demonstrating that the challenged practice is, on 
balance, efficient. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 123–25 (citing Richard A. 
Posner, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 116 (2d ed. 2001)). 
 95. Alan Devlin, Analyzing Monopoly Power Ex Ante, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 153, 155, 156 
(2009). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam). 
 97. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 98. Id. at 58–59. 
 99. Id. In   contrast   to   illegal   “exclusionary   conduct,”   “competition   on   the  merits”   is   often  
characterized  by  a  single  firm’s  internal  activities that are per se lawful, such as nonexploitative 
pricing, higher output, improved product quality, energetic market penetration, successful 
research and development, and cost-reducing innovations. See 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 626(b) at 77–78 (1978). But see Elhauge, supra note 36, at 255 
(asserting   that  Section  2  doctrine  uses  “a  barrage  of  conclusory   labels,”  such  as  “exclusionary”  
and  “competition  on   the  merits,”   that   fail   to  provide  a   coherent   standard   for   judges   to separate 
desirable from undesirable conduct). 
 100. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. 
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of false positives.101 The accepted standard must also “be reasonably 
susceptible to judicial control, which means that the court must be 
able to identify the conduct as anticompetitive and either fashion a 
penalty producing the correct amount of deterrence or an equitable 
remedy likely to improve competition.”102 The following sections 
examine how, over the last decade, the Supreme Court has analyzed 
discrete forms of monopolizing conduct after plaintiffs have 
established the first prong of monopoly power. 
III.  WHEN UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL VIOLATE SECTION 2 
As early as 1897, the Supreme Court recognized the right of a 
private trader or manufacturer to  
sell to whom he pleases; . . . charge different prices for the 
same article to different individuals; . . . charge as much as 
he can get for the article in which he deals, whether the 
price be reasonable or unreasonable . . . and . . . cease to do 
any business whenever his choice lies in that direction.103 
Later Supreme Court decisions have clarified that these rights are not 
unqualified.104 Part A of this Section focuses on leading Supreme 
Court decisions, particularly emphasizing the manner in which the 
Court’s decision in Trinko altered the landscape of unilateral refusals 
to deal as previously defined by Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp.105 Part B analyzes the different ways in 
which lower federal courts are interpreting the Trinko decision. 
 
 101. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 83, at 89–90. 
 102. Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 148–49 
(2005). 
 103. United States v. Trans-Missouri  Freight  Ass’n,  166  U.S.  290,  320–21 (1897) (involving 
horizontal price-fixing and holding that the Sherman Act applied to the railroad industry). In spite 
of this expansive recognition, early court decisions still condemned unilateral refusals to deal 
when coupled with a patently anticompetitive purpose. Compare United States v. Colgate, 250 
U.S. 300 (1918) (finding no violation of Section 2 through contracts that aimed to prevent dealers 
from freely exercising the right to sell), with Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 
(1951) (finding a violation  of  Section  2  based  on  a  monopoly  newspaper’s   refusal   to  deal  with  
advertisers who also placed ads with a radio station viewed as a competitor by the newspaper). 
 104. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985); Lorain, 
342 U.S. at 155 (suggesting that the right to select customers or refuse advertisements can only be 
exercised in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly); see Colgate, 250 U.S. 
at  307  (finding  that  the  right  to  refuse  to  deal  exists  “[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or 
maintain  a  monopoly”). 
 105. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
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A.  The Supreme Court and 
Unilateral Refusals to Deal 
For almost two decades, the leading Section 2 case on refusals to 
deal was Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., in 
which the Court found unlawful a monopolist ski resort’s refusal to 
deal with a smaller rival.106 The two ski resorts had operated 
competitively for several years, even collaborating in a joint, all-area 
ski pass that generated profits for both resorts.107 When the plaintiff 
refused to accept lower revenue percentages of the joint ticket, the 
defendant-monopolist ended the business relationship and even 
refused to sell its lift tickets to the plaintiff at retail value.108 Defining 
predatory behavior as “attempting to exclude rivals on some basis 
other than efficiency,”109 the Aspen Court affirmed the lower court’s 
judgment against the monopolist, noting that it was “willing to 
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a 
perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”110 The Court found 
that the defendant’s refusal to deal was completely motivated by a 
desire to deprive its rival of any benefit, even though cooperation 
“would have entailed no cost . . . , would have provided immediate 
benefits, and would have satisfied potential consumers.”111 Adding to 
this efficiency-based definition of predatory conduct, the Court in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services112 emphasized that 
no violation of the law exists if there are legitimate business reasons 
for the refusal to deal, as stated in Aspen’s jury instructions.113 Thus, 
until 2004, Aspen effectively led courts deciding antitrust cases to 
hold that refusals to continue dealing with rivals might violate 
 
 106. Id. at 610–11. 
 107. See id. at 589–92. 
 108. See id. at 592–93. 
 109. Id. at 605 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 138 (1978)). 
 110. See id. at 610–11. 
 111. See id. at 610. 
 112. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 113. Id. at 483 n.32 (citing Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 602–605); accord Lorain Journal 
Co.  v.  United  States,  342  U.S.  143  (1951)  (finding  liability  under  Section  2  where  a  monopolist’s  
refusal   to  deal   lacked  any   substantial  business   justification  and   stemmed   from   the   rival  party’s  
unwillingness to enter into an anticompetitive agreement intended to injure competition). 
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Section 2 in the absence of valid business justifications evidencing 
internal efficiencies or benefits to consumers.114 
The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Trinko cannot 
confidently be deemed a watershed decision,115 but the Court 
certainly changed the landscape of Section 2 liability by limiting the 
Aspen exception and endorsing probusinessif not 
promonopoly116interests.117 The plaintiffs in Trinko were AT&T 
customers who claimed that Verizon failed to comply with its 
obligations under federal law118 to provide AT&T and other rivals 
with access to its network.119 This violation, they asserted, 
contravened Section 2 because Verizon intended to discourage 
AT&T customers from remaining with the service and ultimately 
impaired AT&T’s ability to compete in the local telephone service 
market.120 
Instead of entering into an Aspen-style inquiry about whether 
Verizon possessed valid business reasons for refusing 
interconnection services to its rivals, the Court emphasized that it 
could not derive anticompetitive intent from Verizon’s failure to 
comply with federal law121 and that the existence of regulatory 
mechanisms to deter anticompetitive harm lessened the need for 
increased judicial involvement.122 Most significantly, the Court 
effectively eliminated potential avenues to claiming Section 2 
liability by proclaiming that the refusal to deal exhibited in Trinko 
 
 114. See J. Thomas Rosch, The Common Law of Section 2: Is It Still Alive and Well?, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163, 1170 (2008). 
 115. See id. at 1169 (“The  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Trinko generated more questions than 
answers.”).  In  fact,  the  Trinko decision did not expressly overrule any prior Section 2 cases. Id. at 
1170. 
 116. Bonny E. Sweeney, An Overview of Section 2 Enforcement and Developments, 2008 
WIS. L. REV. 231, 243 (2008). 
 117. See Verizon   Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
 118. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
 119. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402–03. 
 120. Id. at 404–05. 
 121. Id. at  409  (noting  that  Verizon’s  reluctance  to  comply  with  federal  law  “tells  us  nothing  
about  dreams  of  monopoly”). 
 122. Id. at 411–13  (holding  that  the  Telecommunication  Act’s  “extensive  provision  for  access  
makes  it  unnecessary  to  impose  a  judicial  doctrine  of  forced  access” and finding that the system 
of regulation and penalties imposed by the New York Public Service Commission and the Federal 
Communications  Commission  “was  an  effective  steward  of  the  antitrust  function”). 
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did not “fit within the limited exception recognized in Aspen.”123 The 
Court found that the Aspen exception did not apply because 
Verizon’s course of dealing was mandated by law, while the 
monopolist in Aspen, Aspen Skiing, voluntarily engaged in joint 
ticketing with its rival; because Verizon did not market to the public 
or make the services at issue available to them, while Aspen Skiing 
directly sold tickets at retail; and because Verizon was subject to a 
regulatory framework dictating restrictions and remedies, while 
Aspen Skiing’s business decisions were governed by no such 
structure.124 Therefore, Trinko suggests that monopolists have no 
duty to continue to deal with rivals unless the monopolist unilaterally 
severs a voluntary and profitable course of dealing that suggests a 
“distinctly anticompetitive bent.”125 Notably, post-Trinko courts and 
commentators have not reached a consensus on how to read and 
apply the case.126 One commentator summarized the ambiguity of the 
Court’s decision quite succinctly: “We are left with the clear rule that 
monopolists do not have a duty to assist their competitors, except 
when they do.”127 
B.  Discord in Deciphering 
Refusals to Deal 
In 2006, one commentator wondered whether later courts would 
ultimately apply the Supreme Court’s “thinly veiled swipes at 
antitrust” far beyond the facts of the case.128 Although J. Thomas 
Rosch, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, answered 
the inquiry in the negative in 2008,129 the impact of the Trinko 
decision continues to generate divergent speculation among courts 
 
 123. Id. at 409. 
 124. See id. at 409, 411–12. 
 125. Id. at 409. 
 126. See MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 149; Hovenkamp, supra note 102, 
at 147–48  (“No  generalized  formulation  of  unilateral  or  multilateral  exclusionary  conduct  enjoys  
anything  approaching  universal  acceptance.”); discussion infra Part III.A. 
 127. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Bargaining and Monopolization: In Search of the 
“Boundary   of   Section   2   Liability”   Between   Aspen and Trinko, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 152 
(2005); see MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 149. 
 128. Michael A. Carrier, Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and Intellectual Property, 31 J. CORP. L. 
357, 373 (2006); accord James A. Keyte, supra note 80, at 50  (“There  is  no  reason  why  similar  
reasoning will not be extended to any number of antitrust areas . . . .”). 
 129. Rosch, supra note 114, at 1170 (observing that lower federal appellate courts have 
construed Trinko fairly narrowly). 
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and scholars about the future of refusal-to-deal claims.130 While it 
has become clear that lower courts now limit Aspen to its facts, their 
interpretations of the Trinko decision have proven inconsistent at 
best.131 Lower federal court decisions have emphasized a wide 
spectrum of Trinko take-away requisites for Section 2 liability. For 
example, some courts have found that Section 2 liability for a refusal 
to deal under Trinko requires a unilateral severance of a voluntary 
and profitable course of dealing.132 Other courts have underscored 
the existence of persuasive evidence of anticompetitive intent or the 
presence of an active regulatory scheme.133 A large number of lower 
courts interpreting Trinko continue to echo Aspen, placing the 
heaviest emphasis on whether there is an absence of a valid business 
justification that exhibits a “willing[ness] to sacrifice short-run 
benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run 
impact on [a] smaller rival.”134 Moreover, consideration of the 
essential facilities doctrine—which requires equal access for all 
competitors to an indispensable facility that cannot be equally 
duplicated135—continues to percolate through the lower courts 
 
 130. Compare Robert A. Skitol, Three Years After Verizon v. Trinko: Broad Dissatisfaction 
with the Whole Thrust of Refusal to Deal Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE,  Apr.  2007,  at  1,  5  (“Trinko’s  
analysis of Aspen has become an instructive roadmap for plaintiffs asserting refusal-to-deal 
claims . . . .”),  with Lopatka & Page, supra note 127,  at  152  (“We  are  left  with  the  clear  rule  that  
monopolists  do  not  have  a  duty  to  assist  their  competitors,  except  when  they  do.”). 
 131. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach to Dominant Firms 
Under the Antitrust Laws?, 59 ME. L. REV. 111,   132   (2007)   (“Lower   courts   have   not   been  
uniform in their application of Trinko principles.”);;  Keyte,  supra note 80,  at  47  (“Aspen has now 
effectively  been  limited  to  its  facts.”). 
 132. E.g.,  LiveUniverse,  Inc.  v.  MySpace,  Inc.,  304  F.  App’x  554,  556  (9th  Cir.  2008); Covad 
Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1049 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Apple iPod 
iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2011); RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. v. 
Alcon Labs., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 218, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd sub nom. RxUSA Wholesale, 
Inc. v. Alcon Labs.,  391  F.  App’x  59 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 133. E.g., Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341 
(S.D. Fla. 2011); N.Y. Jets LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 2875(HB), 2005 WL 
2649330 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2005). 
 134. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985); e.g., 
Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216, 1223 
(10th Cir. 2009); MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Precision CPAP, Inc. v. Jackson Hosp., No. 2:05cv1096-MHT, 2010 WL 797170, at *11 (M.D. 
Ala. Mar. 8, 2010); Int’l  Bus.  Machs.  Corp.  v.  Platform  Solutions,  Inc.,  658  F.  Supp.  2d  603,  613  
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1197 (D. Utah 
2009). 
 135. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 858 (6th Cir. 1979). 
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despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Trinko left the viability of 
the doctrine in serious doubt.136 
1.  Cessation of Voluntary and 
Profitable Business Dealings 
The Supreme Court in Aspen never held that a defendant must 
cease prior voluntary business dealings in order to be held liable 
under Section 2 for refusing to deal.137 However, several circuit 
courts following the Trinko decision have imposed such a 
requirement, thereby narrowing even further the scope of behavior 
constituting an unlawful refusal to deal.138 For example, in 2008, the 
Ninth Circuit in LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc.139 interpreted 
Trinko to require that an unlawful refusal to deal evinces a 
“unilateral termination of a voluntary and profitable course of 
dealing.”140 In affirming the district court’s holding that MySpace, 
Inc. did not violate Section 2 by deactivating links leading users from 
its website to plaintiff’s networking website,141 the Ninth Circuit 
recognized “the narrow scope of the refusal to deal exception.”142 A 
California district court echoed this position in 2011 in In re Apple 
iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation143 when it granted defendant Apple 
Computer, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment, emphasizing that 
“Plaintiffs present[ed] no evidence that Defendant had a prior course 
 
 136. See Verizon  Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices  of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.  398,  411  
(2004) (finding no need either to recognize or repudiate the essential facilities doctrine). 
 137. See Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 610–11; Helicopter Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Erickson 
Air-Crane, Inc., No. CV 06-3077-PA, 2008 WL 151833, at *9 (D. Or. Jan. 14,   2008)   (“The  
Supreme Court has never held that termination of a preexisting course of dealing is a necessary 
element  of  an  antitrust  claim.”). 
 138. See Keyte, supra note 80, at 49 (noting that lower courts have “focused  on  the  limitation  
of Aspen to   ‘voluntary’   prior   courses   of   dealing.”).  But cf. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. 
Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1986) (dismissing a suit by competitors alleging 
Section 2 violation because judicial condemnation would likely have the perverse effect of 
discouraging cooperation in the first instance). 
 139. LiveUniverse,  Inc.  v.  Myspace,  Inc.,  304  F.  App’x  554,  556  (9th  Cir.  2008). 
 140. Id. at 556 (quoting MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 141. Id. at 555–56. 
 142. Id. at 556. 
 143. 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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of dealing” to support their claim that Apple unlawfully refused to 
license its audio digital-file-sharing software to the plaintiffs.144 
The Second Circuit has held similarly, observing that the “sole 
exception to the right of refusal to deal” arises where the defendant 
terminates a prior relationship, marking a change in position 
characteristic of monopolistic motives.145 In RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. 
v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc.,146 a case brought by a secondary 
pharmaceutical-product wholesaler against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, the court echoed this point by emphasizing that the 
complaint failed to allege that the defendants voluntarily engaged in 
a course of dealing.147 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in 2004 in 
Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp.148 deemed “the 
unilateral termination of a voluntary course of dealing a requirement 
for a valid refusal-to-deal claim . . . .”149 Citing Trinko, the circuit 
court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant telephone 
company violated Section 2 by failing to provide DSL service as 
mandated under federal law.150 Noting the Trinko Court’s emphasis 
on “the coercive effect of the [FTC Act],” which requires an 
interconnection agreement, the Covad court found no voluntary 
course of dealing between the parties.151 
These decisions touting the necessity of showing a prior course 
of dealing have narrowed the Aspen exception considerably. Before 
Trinko, plaintiffs could arguably allege Section 2 violations (for 
exclusionary or predatory conduct) under Aspen where competition 
had been impaired “in an unnecessarily restrictive way,” where firms 
attempted to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency, 
 
 144. See id. at 1145–46  (“[T]he  Ninth  Circuit  has  since  clarified  that  a  refusal-to-deal claim, 
under Trinko, requires  the  ‘unilateral  termination  of  a  voluntary  and  profitable  course  of  dealing’  
between  competitors.”  (quoting  MetroNet, 383 F.3d at 1132)). 
 145. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2007); see Williams v. 
Citigroup,   Inc.,  433  F.  App’x  36   (2d  Cir.  2011)   (dismissing a Section 2 claim where plaintiff-
attorney failed to demonstrate that the defendant-underwriter   “terminated   a   prior,   voluntary  
course  of  dealing”). 
 146. RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd 
sub nom. RxUSA  Wholesale  Inc.  v.  Alcon  Labs.,  391  F.  App’x  59  (2d  Cir.  2010). 
 147. Id. at   228.  However,   the   court’s   ultimate   dismissal   of   the   plaintiff’s   Section   2   claims  
hinged  on  the  plaintiff’s  failure to prove that the parties were in direct competition. Id. at 227–28. 
 148. 374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 149. Id. at 1049 (referencing Aspen and Trinko). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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where the alleged conduct impaired the opportunities of rivals, or 
where conduct failed to further competition on the merits.152 
However, it now appears that the lower courts imposing the narrow 
requirement of prior, voluntary business dealings have severely 
constricted such channels. Aspen no longer provides plaintiffs with a 
number of strategies with which to pursue a Section 2 claim. 
Consigned to rest “at or near the outer boundary of Section 2 
liability,”153 Aspen has been reduced to a narrow exception to 
Trinko’s proclamation that there is generally no duty to deal, and it 
demands that plaintiffs not only prove that a monopolist unilaterally 
severed a profitable course of dealing, but that there was an ongoing, 
voluntary relationship prior to the alleged refusal to deal. 
2.  Persuasive Evidence of 
Anticompetitive Intent 
Some courts, post-Trinko, have looked to the existence of 
anticompetitive intent to determine whether a refusal to deal violates 
Section 2 in spite of the fact that the Trinko decision makes no 
mention of the word intent.154 It is clear that “specific intent to 
monopolize” is not an element of actual monopolization;155 however, 
lower courts, citing Aspen, have treated intent as probative evidence 
of anticompetitive effects and of whether the refusal to deal is 
unlawfully exclusionary.156 For example, in 2005, the district court in 
New York Jets LLC v. Cablevision Systems Corp.,157 in determining 
whether Cablevision’s refusal to air the Jets’ advertisements 
constituted an unlawful refusal to deal, emphasized that a refusal to 
deal is impermissible “when the purpose of such refusal is to 
maintain a monopoly.”158 In denying Cablevision’s motion to 
 
 152. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985); see 
Keyte, supra note 80, at 47. 
 153. Verizon  Commc’ns   Inc.   v.   Law  Offices   of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.   398,   409  
(2004). 
 154. See N.Y. Jets LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 2875(HB), 2005 WL 2649330 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2005). 
 155. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 156. See Aspen Skiing Co.,   472   U.S.   at   602   (“[T]he   question   of   intent   is   relevant   to   the  
offense of monopolization in determining whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized 
as  ‘exclusionary,’  or  ‘anticompetitive,’. . .  or  ‘predatory.’”). 
 157. No. 05 Civ. 2875(HB), 2005 WL 2649330 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2005). 
 158. Id. at *8. 
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dismiss, the court noted that the   cable   provider’s sale of airtime to 
other consumers, but not to the plaintiff, might indicate its desire to 
prevent the plaintiff from encroaching on Cablevision’s monopoly 
and thus would constitute conduct “predicated on an impermissible 
purpose.”159 
Similarly, in 2011, the district court in Sunbeam Television 
Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc.160 asserted that refusal-to-deal 
claims might fall within the Aspen exception if “specific compelling 
factors suggest anticompetitive purpose and effect in a manner which 
alleviates concern over ambiguous evidence and tenuous 
inferences . . . .”161 Sunbeam alleged that Nielsen’s subscription 
policy essentially forced it to incur costly expenses.162 Contrary to 
the court’s holding in New York Jets, the Sunbeam court ultimately 
granted Nielsen’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the 
evidence of both anticompetitive purpose and effect was insufficient 
to meet the Aspen exception. Although Nielsen’s policy might have 
swayed some competitors from entering the market, its 
implementation fell beyond the outer boundary of Section 2 
liability.163 In this way, courts use evidence of a monopolist’s intent 
as a primary indicator of an illegal refusal to deal. 
The district court in Safeway Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories164 
similarly emphasized that a plaintiff must demonstrate 
anticompetitive intent, as well as a voluntary and profitable course of 
dealing, in order to prevail on a refusal-to-deal claim under the Aspen 
exception.165 The plaintiffs in Safeway were direct purchasers of 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 161. Id. at  1350.  The  district  court  admitted  that  this  was  “the  most  sensible  reconciliation  of  
Trinko and Aspen Skiing”   given   that   “the   current   state   of   refusal   to   deal/essential   facility  
jurisprudence  is  somewhat  uncertain.”  Id. at 1349–50. 
 162. See id. at   1348.   Specifically,   Nielsen’s   policies   required   Sunbeam   to   return   all   of   its  
historical   ratings  data  upon   termination  of   its   subscription   to  Nielsen’s   ratings.   Id. at 1347–48. 
This costly policy allegedly coerced Sunbeam and other Nielsen customers to purchase ratings 
simultaneously from both Nielsen and its potential rival. Id. at 1348. 
 163. Id. at 1350, 1359. However, a bigger source of uncertainty for the court was whether the 
rationale of Trinko ought to be applied to each form of anticompetitive conduct or to the 
defendant’s  behavior  in  the  aggregate.  Id. at  1350  (“This  tension  underlies  antitrust  jurisprudence,  
and  one  can  only  hope  that  appellate  courts  have  an  opportunity  to  resolve  it  in  the  near  future.”).  
But see discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (emphasizing that an assessment of monopolistic conduct for 
potential liability must be viewed in the aggregate in the context of predatory pricing). 
 164. 761 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 165. Id. at 893–94. 
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pharmaceutical products who claimed that the defendant 
pharmaceutical manufacturer engaged in a sudden 400 percent 
increase of a protease inhibitor, which impaired the plaintiffs’ ability 
to compete.166 The court had previously ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor 
on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that “liability under 
Section 2 could arise if a defendant unilaterally alters a voluntary 
course of dealing and ‘anticompetitive malice’ motivates the 
defendant’s conduct.”167 Denying the defendant’s motion, the court 
found that the plaintiffs’ evidence suggested that the defendant 
engaged in massive and sudden price hikes to impair competition 
“with anticompetitive malice.”168 Notably, while the Trinko Court 
declined to speculate about the defendant’s intent to monopolize, 
proclaiming that “Verizon’s reluctance to interconnect . . . tells us 
nothing about dreams of monopoly,”169 it appears that some lower 
courts continue to consider a monopolist’s intent as probative 
evidence of an unlawful refusal to deal. 
3.  Refusal to Deal Without a 
Legitimate Business Justification 
The Aspen Court criticized a monopolist’s willingness “to 
sacrifice short-run benefits . . . for a perceived long-run impact on its 
smaller rival” without a valid business reason, which could have 
been inferred from evidence of conduct that promoted specific 
efficiencies, such as cost savings passed on to consumers or higher-
quality services.170 After the Trinko decision, however, it appears 
that lower courts exercise broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a valid business justification. It has become more difficult 
for plaintiffs to prove that a monopolist has sacrificed short-term 
profits where the defendant can tie its refusal to deal to any 
 
 166. Id. at 881–82. 
 167. Id. at 894. The  court  reiterated  “three  factors  of  significance”  for  an  unlawful  refusal  to  
deal. Id. (citing MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132–34 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
The circuit court in MetroNet distilled from Trinko that a claim falling within the Aspen exception 
would entail, first, a voluntary and profitable course of dealing; second, an offer to deal on 
unreasonable  terms  and  conditions,  which  could  amount  to  a  “practical  refusal  to  deal”;;  and  third,  
a refusal to provide competitors with products already sold at retail. MetroNet, 383 F.3d at 1132–
33. 
 168. Safeway, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 895. 
 169. Verizon  Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices  of  Curtis  V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). 
 170. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–611 (1985). 
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investment or innovation efforts aimed at protecting its short-term 
profits and improving its long-term gains. 
For example, in 2009, the district court in International Business 
Machines Corp. v. Platform Solutions, Inc.171 granted a motion to 
dismiss where the defendant, IBM, decided to discontinue licensing 
its operating system to the plaintiff.172 Emphasizing the presence of 
valid business justifications for terminating the relationship, the court 
found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that IBM had forgone 
short-term profits by refusing to license its patents.173 The court 
pointed out that where IBM had invested billions of dollars to make 
its operating systems more functional and competitive, it was “not 
required to support and maintain its thirty-one bit technology” at 
issue.174 
Some courts have even defined “valid business justification” to 
include acts that would likely allow a firm to acquire monopoly 
power. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s Section 2 claim in 
Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co.,175 the Tenth Circuit 
emphasized that “[t]he critical fact in Aspen Skiing was that there 
were no valid business reasons for the refusal.”176 In Christy Sports, 
the circuit court found that the defendant was free to begin exercising 
a restrictive covenant following years of nonenforcement and stop 
dealing with a rival in order to promote its own ski-rental facility.177 
Although this would likely lead to the defendant’s acquisition of 
monopoly power in the ski rental market,178 the court emphasized 
that the plaintiff was on notice that the business relationship was 
temporary and that “antitrust laws should not be allowed to stifle a 
business’s ability to experiment in how it operates, nor forbid it to 
change course upon discovering a preferable path.”179 
 
 171. 658 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 172. Id. at 615. 
 173. Id. at 613–14. 
 174. Id. 
 175. 555 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 176. Id. at 1197. 
 177. Id. at 1190–91. 
 178. See Paul Jones, Analyzing Refusal-to-Deal Cases Under Brooke   Group’s Predatory 
Pricing Test: The Tenth Circuit Misses the Mark in Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort 
Co., 2010 BYU L. REV. 135, 135 (2010). 
 179. Christy Sports, LLC, 555 F.3d at 1197–98. 
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It appears that nearly any refusal that a monopolist justifies as an 
investment in its own services will suffice for a court to grant 
dismissal or summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Drawing 
on Christy Sports, the Tenth Circuit in Four Corners Nephrology 
Associates, P.C. v. Mercy Medical Center of Durango180 granted the 
defendant hospital’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the 
Aspen exception does not require more economic justification than a 
defendant’s pursuance of a course of action “to protect and maximize 
its chances of profitability in the short-term.”181 The defendant 
hospital had shared its facilities with the plaintiff nephrologist, who 
declined to become an active hospital staff member but remained a 
consultant.182 The hospital later decided to grant nephrology services 
exclusively through its own practice and terminated the plaintiff’s 
consulting privileges.183 Although the circuit court found that the 
defendant willfully incurred short-term losses of up to $500,000 to 
create its own practice, it determined that the defendant had refused 
to deal with the plaintiff “to avoid an unprofitable relationship” and 
that it did so to protect its investment in its own practice.184 
Following suit in an analogous case, an Alabama district court in 
Precision CPAP, Inc. v. Jackson Hospital185 granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss where the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the 
defendants’ “unilateral termination of a voluntary . . . course of 
dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits.”186 The 
plaintiffs, providers of durable medical equipment (DME), alleged 
that the defendant hospitals’ decision to stop referring patients to 
plaintiffs’ services in order to promote their own joint ventures with 
DME providers violated Section 2.187 The court, in recognizing 
Trinko’s modification of the refusal-to-deal standard,188 emphasized 
that there was no evidence that the defendant’s cessation of dealings 
 
 180. 582 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 181. Id. at 1225. 
 182. Id. at 1217–18. 
 183. Id. at 1218–19. 
 184. See id. at 1217–18, 1225 (emphasis in original). 
 185. No. 2:05cv1096-MHT, 2010 WL 797170 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2010). 
 186. Id. at *11. 
 187. Id. at *1–2. 
 188. Id. at *10. 
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with the plaintiffs “was for any purpose other than increasing both 
the short-term and long-term profits of their DME providers.”189 
Not all courts have granted monopolists leeway in what 
constitutes a valid business justification. In sharp contrast to the 
Tenth Circuit, in the 2005 case, Covad Communications Co. v. Bell 
Atlantic Corp.,190 the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a district 
court’s   denial   of a defendant’s motion to dismiss although the 
plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Precision, failed to specify that the 
defendant’s refusal to deal resulted in a short-term economic loss.191 
Rather, the court found it sufficient that the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant’s refusal to deal was “predatory” since, according to the 
court, “a ‘predatory’ practice is one in which a firm sacrifices short-
term profits in order to drive out of the market or otherwise 
discipline a competitor.”192 Similarly, the Safeway court upheld the 
plaintiffs’ claim and found significant the fact that the defendant’s 
allegedly exclusionary price hike came “at some cost” and without 
evidence of a short-term benefit.193 Citing again to Metronet, the 
court in Safeway noted that the Ninth Circuit found dispositive the 
defendant’s “willingness to sacrifice short-term benefits in order to 
obtain higher profits in the long run from the exclusion of 
competition.”194 
These decisions emphasizing a profit-sacrifice standard195 
suggest that courts exercise broad discretion in deciding whether a 
defendant’s short-term losses are part of a valid business strategy or 
 
 189. Id. at *11. 
 190. 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 191. Id. at 675–76. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Safeway Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 761 F. Supp. 2d 874, 894–95 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 194. MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004). At issue in 
MetroNet was   an   incumbent   local   exchange   carrier’s switch to a new pricing policy after it 
estimated that it was losing $300,000 in revenue to the plaintiffs, who purchased services at a 
volume discount from the defendant and resold them to small businesses. See id. at 1128. 
However, unlike the outcome in Safeway, the MetroNet court  found  that  the  defendant’s  switch  to  
a different pricing system was not an abandonment of short-term profits but rather an attempt to 
increase them after realizing that its policy negatively impacted its own profitability. Id. at 1134. 
 195. See Morris  Commc’ns  Corp.   v.   PGA  Tour,   Inc.,   364  F.3d  1288,  1290,   1295–96 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, and finding   “valid   business  
justifications  for  its  actions”);;  Dealer  Computer  Servs.,  Inc.  v.  Ford  Motor Co., No. Civ.A. H-06-
175, 2006 WL 801033, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006) (rejecting   plaintiff’s   antitrust   claim  
because  defendant  was  “not  sacrificing  short   term  profits  for  long  term  anticompetitive  gains”), 
aff'd sub nom. Dealer Computer Servs. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F. App'x 396 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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are indicative of an overarching anticompetitive intent to impair 
competition in the long run. Moreover, lower court readings of 
Trinko suggest that the protection and pursuit of monopoly profits 
are legitimate business justifications. Tenth Circuit decisions seem to 
go even further, accepting virtually any profit-motivated act as a 
valid business justification. Considering that any business decision 
can be rooted in a profit motive, some lower court decisions seem to 
suggest that courts can completely eradicate the need for any 
business justification at all. 
4.  Refusal in the Absence of 
an Active Regulatory Scheme 
As the Trinko Court observed, active regulatory oversight 
“diminishes the likelihood of major antitrust harm.”196 Since 2004, a 
vast number of lower courts have applied Trinko’s rationale and 
dismissed Section 2 claims where the allegedly exclusionary or 
predatory conduct at issue was monitored and remediable by an 
active regulatory scheme. For example, in Stein v. Pacific Bell,197 a 
case brought by a subscriber to defendant  Pacific  Bell’s  DSL  service, 
the Ninth Circuit found that the course of dealing between the parties 
“occurred within a congressionally-imposed regulatory 
scheme”namely, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(“TCA”)“and therefore ‘[did] not fit comfortably in the Aspen 
Skiing mold’ of voluntariness.”198 Similarly, in Covad 
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp.,199 the Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed the plaintiff’s refusal-to-deal claim, holding that the 
defendant telephone company did not violate Section 2 by refusing to 
provide interconnection services pursuant to the TCA.200 Like the 
Supreme Court in Trinko, the circuit court decided that the 
distinctive federal regulatory regime “created a broad and detailed 
regulatory environment that effectively abrogated the need for 
 
 196. Verizon  Commc’ns   Inc.   v.   Law  Offices   of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.   398,   412  
(2004) (citing Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 197. 172 F. App’x 192 (2006). 
 198. Id. at 193 (quoting MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d at 1132). 
 199. 374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 200. Id. at 1049. 
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antitrust scrutiny.”201 Moreover, beyond finding that the TCA’s 
savings clause barred a finding of implied immunity from antitrust 
laws, the court found that the TCA was an “effective and even more 
ambitious mechanism for regulating the telecom industry [than the 
Sherman Act].”202 
Conversely, where a regulatory scheme lacks the power or clear 
authority to address or remedy the alleged anticompetitive conduct at 
issue, courts have declined to apply Trinko, finding that the 
defendant’s anticompetitive breach of regulatory enforcement 
violates Section 2.203 An early example, cited in Trinko, is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States,204 in which municipal entities brought suit against an 
electrical power company that had refused to transmit power from 
other suppliers to the plaintiffs.205 Finding that the Federal Power 
Commission, which employed some regulatory oversight over the 
transmission lines, lacked the authority to order the defendant to 
cooperate, the Court sustained the plaintiffs’ Section 2 refusal-to-
deal claim.206 
In 2004, the Second Circuit in In re Remeron Antitrust 
Litigation,207 a case involving not a refusal to deal but allegedly 
anticompetitive delays in patent listings to extend a monopoly, held 
that neither the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations nor 
the Hatch-Waxman Act gave regulators the power to enforce rules 
and penalties against the defendant drug manufacturer, and, 
 
 201. Id. Although   the   text   of   the   TCA   states   that   “nothing   in   this   Act   or   the   amendments  
made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the 
antitrust  laws,”  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  Pub.  L.  104-104, 110 Stat. 56, cases like Covad 
suggest that lower courts are doing the opposite. 
 202. Covad  Commc’ns Co., 374 F.3d at 1049. 
 203. Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 
1048 (D. Colo. 2004). Courts have also upheld refusal-to-deal claims despite an active regulatory 
scheme where plaintiffs can demonstrate that the alleged conduct at issue falls outside the scope 
of such regulation. E.g., Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp. 398 F.3d 666, 669–70 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (upholding the plaintiff’s  claim   that   the  defendant   failed   to  sell  DSL  service   to  potential  
customers  because  the  defendant’s  conduct  was  “unrelated  to  duties”  imposed  by  the  controlling  
Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
 204. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 205. See id. at 368. 
 206. See id. at 373–74. 
 207. 335 F. Supp. 2d 522 (D.N.J. 2004). 
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therefore, antitrust laws applied.208 The court contrasted the 
fragmented power of FDA regulators with the completeness of the 
regulatory scheme of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 and found 
no indication that antitrust laws had been superseded by the Hatch-
Waxman Act or FDA regulations.209 Similarly, in 2005, a district 
court sustained a refusal-to-deal claim in Stand Energy Corp. v. 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.210 because the controlling Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) statutes had not granted the 
authority to remedy the defendant’s refusal to provide access to 
transportation and shipping services.211 The court additionally noted 
that “FERC’s authority to remedy anti-competitive behavior is 
decidedly less than the regulatory authority in Trinko.”212 These 
cases make clear that plaintiffs asserting refusal-to-deal claims 
within the regulatory context are more likely to encounter success 
where the regulatory scheme lacks the power or capacity to detect or 
remedy monopolizing behavior. Without this condition, Trinko 
leaves little opportunity for plaintiffs to assert viable claims in 
regulated industries. 
5.  Viability of the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine 
The Trinko decision left many commentators speculating about 
the state of the essential facilities doctrine.213 Several decades prior 
to Trinko, federal district and circuit courts developed the essential 
facilities doctrine, which states that the “owner of a properly defined 
‘essential facility’ has a duty to share it with others, and that a refusal 
 
 208. See id. at  531.  The  court  emphasized  that  “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to 
the   particular   structure   and   circumstances   of   the   industry   at   issue”   and   that   “[c]areful   account  
must  be  taken  of  the  pervasive  federal  and  state  regulation  characteristic  of  the  industry.”   Id. at 
530 n.10 (citing Verizon  Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices  of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.  398,  
411 (2004)). 
 209. Id. at 530–31. 
 210. 373 F. Supp. 2d 631 (S.D. W. Va. 2005). 
 211. See id. at 641. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Compare Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko? The Silent Revolution of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153,   154   (2005)   (commenting   on   “a   nearly  
obliterated  essential  facilities  doctrine”),  with Rosch, supra note 114, at 1170  (observing  that  “the  
essential  facility  doctrine  has  survived  largely  intact”). 
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to do so violates § 2 of the Sherman Act.”214 As a Maryland district 
court recently explained, to establish a Section 2 violation under the 
essential facilities doctrine, a plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) 
control by the monopolist of the essential facility; (2) the inability of 
the competitor seeking access to practically or reasonably duplicate 
the facility; (3) the denial of the facility to the competitor; and (4) the 
feasibility of the monopolist to provide the facility.”215 In deciding 
Trinko, the Supreme Court found “no need either to recognize . . . or 
to repudiate” the doctrine, but it briefly asserted that essential facility 
claims should be denied where a regulatory scheme exists and is 
equipped to compel and regulate sharing.216 Thus, the Supreme Court 
seemed to foreclose the viability of the essential facilities doctrine in 
the regulatory context. 
Taking cues from the highest court, many lower federal courts 
have dispensed with the essential facilities doctrine where a 
regulatory framework mandates access to services among 
competitors.217 For example, in New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. 
v. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.,218 a district court rejected the 
plaintiff’s essential facilities claim that the defendant’s denial of 
access to its posted settlement prices, which the plaintiff required to 
conduct certain business transactions, constituted a Section 2 
violation.219 The court denied the claim, “leaving it to regulatory 
agencies, rather than antitrust courts, to regulate the terms of any 
forced access.”220 In a similar vein, the district court in Z-Tel 
Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc.221 rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that the controlling regulatory agency lacked 
 
 214. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE § 7.7, at 306 (2d ed. 1999). 
 215. Loren Data Corp. v. GXS, Inc., No. DKC 10-3474, 2011 WL 3511003, at *10 (D. Md. 
Aug. 9, 2011) (citing Laurel Sand & Gravel Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 
1991)). 
 216. Verizon  Commn’ns   Inc.   v.  Law  Offices   of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,   540  U.S.  398,  411  
(2004). 
 217. E.g., N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 559 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 218. 323 F. Supp. 2d 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 219. Id. at 569. 
 220. Id. (citing Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08). The Mercantile Exchange court went on to 
reiterate the Supreme  Court’s  concern  in  Trinko about  the  “supreme  evil  of  antitrust:  collusion.”  
Id. (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408). 
 221. 331 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
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power to compel the defendant to provide access to shared 
transport.222 Consistent with Trinko, the court reiterated that 
“essential facility claims should . . . be denied where a state or 
federal agency has effective power to compel sharing and to regulate 
its scope and terms.”223 
However, post-Trinko, some lower courts continue to recognize 
and employ the doctrine outside of regulated industries. For example, 
in Wood v. Archibald Medical Center, Inc.,224 decided in 2006, a 
Georgia district court upheld a plaintiff medical director’s essential 
facilities claim that the defendant denied the plaintiff medical 
privileges at the defendant’s hospital without valid business 
reasons.225 In upholding the viability of the essential facilities 
doctrine, the district court emphasized the inverse of the Court’s 
comment in Trinko that the doctrine serves no purpose where access 
exists,226 asserting that “a plaintiff has the burden of proving that a 
defendant controls an essential facility, has refused access to said 
facility, and that a facility cannot be practically or economically 
duplicated.”227 In a similar vein, the district court in Nobody in 
Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc.228 
upheld a Section 2 claim, finding that both the essential facilities 
doctrine and the Aspen exception applied.229 In that case, the 
plaintiffsconcert promoting businessesalleged that the defendant 
radio station’s termination of advertising and promotional dealings 
 
 222. Id. at 541. 
 223. Id. (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 773(e), at 150 (2003 Supp.)); 
accord MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
the essential facilities doctrine is still viable after Trinko but declining to apply it in the case); 
Covad  Commc’ns  Co.  v.  BellSouth  Corp.,  374  F.3d  1044,  1049–50 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
the ability of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 to compel access foreclosed essential 
facilities claim); Am. Channel, LLC v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 06-2175(DWF/SRN), 2007 
WL 142173, at *11 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2007) (denying essential facilities claim where Federal 
Communications Commission regulated access to cable systems); Applera Corp. v. MJ Research, 
Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 338, 348 (D. Conn. 2004) (acknowledging the essential facilities doctrine 
but finding it inapplicable to the case). 
 224. No. 6:05CV53(HL), 2006 WL 1805729 (M.D. Ga. June 29, 2006). 
 225. Id. at *5–6. 
 226. Verizon Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices  of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.  398,  410–11 
(2004). 
 227. Wood, 2006 WL 1805729, at *5–6. 
 228. 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D. Colo. 2004). 
 229. Id. at 1106–08, 1114. 
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with all competing concert promoters constituted a refusal to deal.230 
The plaintiffs claimed that by tying their radio airplay to their 
concert promotions, the defendant violated Section 2.231 The court 
ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
because access to rock radio advertising and promotional support 
could be considered an essential facility and because it found the 
Sherman Act to be “the only mechanism by which Clear Channel’s 
behavior may be policed.”232 These cases make clear that the 
essential facilities doctrine lives on in lower courts as a viable, 
though limited, exception to the general rule that refusals to deal are 
not unlawful.233 
IV.  THE END OF THE GAME 
FOR PRICE SQUEEZES 
Distinct from pricing strategies like volume discounts234 or 
bundling,235 a price squeeze aims to drive rivals from the market and 
occurs where a monopolist sells a product to its rival at a price that 
makes it impossible for rivals to compete at the retail level.236 In the 
process, the monopolist incurs deliberate losses that are recouped by 
charging higher prices after competitors have been driven from the 
market or effectively prevented from offering a competitive price to 
consumers.237 Part A of this section examines how the Supreme 
Court has addressed certain predatory pricing claims, focusing on the 
Court’s decision in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline 
Communications, Inc.238 and its elimination of price-squeeze claims. 
 
 230. Id. at 1106–07. 
 231. Id. at 1107. 
 232. Id. at 1114. 
 233. See Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 
1348–50 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (recognizing the essential facilities doctrine but finding that availability 
of continued subscription access to ratings information precluded its application). 
 234. A volume discount refers to low pricing conditioned on large volume purchases of a 
product. Volume discounts generally have been found to be legal and reflective of cost savings. 
E.g., LePage’s  Inc.  v.  3M  Co.,  324  F.3d  141,  154  (3d  Cir.  2003)  (en  banc). 
 235. Bundling refers to the popular marketing practice of offering two or more different 
products in one discounted bundle. Section 2 scrutiny of bundling is triggered where a monopolist 
intends to leverage its power in one product market to monopolize or attempt to monopolize a 
second market. See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894, 903 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 236. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 (1986). 
 237. Id. 
 238. 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
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Part B illustrates how lower courts have addressed claims of 
predatory pricing and product disparagement in response to the 
Court’s decision in Linkline. 
A.  Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. 
Linkline Communications, Inc. 
Rather than endorse a case-by-case approach to determinations 
of predatory pricing, the Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.239 established a two-prong test to detect 
predatory pricing that violates Section 2.240 First, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant-monopolist’s prices are “below an 
appropriate measure of . . . costs,”241 which allows consumers to 
benefit from the monopolist’s low pricing strategy while competitors 
struggle to compete and eventually exit the market.242 Second, a 
plaintiff must shownot implya “dangerous probability” that the 
defendant-monopolist will recoup its investment in below-cost 
prices.243 The Court in Brooke Group clarified that the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the alleged pricing scheme will likely result in a 
recoupment phase, characterized by sustained supracompetitive 
pricingthat is, pricing above competitive levelsor high entry 
barriers to new entry.244 Thus, single firms that engage in single-
product, above-cost pricing, the success of which is not dependent on 
recoupment, are effectively exempted from Section 2 liability.245 For 
 
 239. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 240. Id. at 222–24. Although Brooke Group centered on a Robinson-Patman Act claim, the 
Court made clear that the same test applies to Section 2 claims. Id. at 222. 
 241. Id. The   Court   declined   to   define   “appropriate,”   leaving   the   conflict   unresolved   in   the  
lower   federal   courts.  While   some   circuits   find   it  presumptively   predatory  when   a  monopolist’s  
prices are below the average variable costthat  is,  the  firm’s  total  variable  costs divided by units 
of outputa   plurality   of   appellate   circuits   has   not   “definitively   articulated   an   appropriate  
measure  of  costs  for  determining  predatory  pricing.”  DENGER ET AL., supra note 66, at 276–79. 
 242. Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 225. 
 243. Id. at 224–25.  The  court  noted  that  the  element  is  satisfied  if,  “given  the  aggregate  losses  
caused by the below-cost pricing, the intended target would likely succumb,”   and   if   the  
monopolist would be sufficiently compensated by the scheme. Id. at 225. 
 244. Id. at 226 (noting that summary disposition of  the  plaintiff’s  claim  is  warranted  in  certain  
situations where new entry is easy or where the defendant monopolist lacks adequate excess 
capacity to absorb the market shares of its rivals). 
 245. See MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 139. While the Court recognized 
that this rule might realistically permit some strategies detrimental to consumers, such as low- but 
above-cost pricing, it observed that “predatory  pricing   schemes  are   rarely   tried,   and  even  more  
rarely successful,”  alluding   to  a   low  risk  of  serious  anticompetitive  consequences.  Brooke Grp. 
Ltd., 509 U.S. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
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example, the Court in Brooke Group affirmed a verdict of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant-monopolists because they had 
“no reasonable prospect of recouping [their] . . . losses.”246 The 
Court’s emphasis on the recoupment requirement additionally signals 
that a strong showing of the probability of recouping profits is 
necessary to survive summary judgment in light of the oft-cited 
observation that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful.”247 
In 2009, the Court’s Trinko decision regarding refusals to deal 
found its way into another area of Section 2 conduct: single-product 
predatory pricing.248 Combining the Brooke Group standard for 
predatory pricing with the refusal-to-deal reasoning in the Trinko 
decision, the Court in Linkline effectively “eliminated from antitrust 
purview” all price-squeeze claims.249 A price squeeze occurs when a 
firmenjoying a monopoly of some input needed by other 
competitorscharges its competitors a higher price while lowering 
retail prices to the point that no competitor could profitably sell the 
same product at retail for less than the monopolist.250 In Linkline, the 
defendant, AT&T, offered DSL services at retail but was also 
mandated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to sell 
wholesale transmission services to the plaintiff and other competing 
DSL companies.251 The plaintiffs alleged that AT&T “squeezed” the 
plaintiffs’ profit margins by charging a high wholesale price to 
competitors for DSL transport and a low retail price to consumers for 
DSL services.252 
 
(1986)).   Moreover,   the   Court   noted   that   such   practices   are   “beyond   the   practical   ability of a 
judicial  tribunal  to  control  without  courting  intolerable  risks  of  chilling  legitimate  price  cutting.”  
Id. at 223. 
 246. Id. at 243. 
 247. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589; see DENGER ET AL., supra note 66, at 295–97; see also 
Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming 
summary judgment based on failure to prove probability of recoupment); United States v. AMR 
Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1209 (D. Kan. 2001) (granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendant based on absence of probable recoupment), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 248. Pac.   Bell   Tel.   Co.   v.   Linkline   Commc’ns,   Inc.,   555   U.S.   438,   450   (2009)   (“[T]he 
reasoning of Trinko applies with equal force to price-squeeze  claims.”). 
 249. Ellen Meriwether, Putting  the  “Squeeze”  on  Refusal  to  Deal  Cases:  Lessons  from  Trinko 
and Linkline, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 65, 65. 
 250. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 436–37 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 251. Linkline, 555 U.S. at 442–43. 
 252. Id. at 443. 
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The Court in Linkline declined to recognize the plaintiffs’ 
claims, holding that an actionable Section 2 claim requires either 
proof of the monopolist’s unlawful refusal to deal or evidence of 
predatory pricing under the Brooke Group standard.253 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs could not challenge 
AT&T’s retail prices, as it found no evidence of retail sales below 
any measure of cost.254 The Court feared that recognizing a price-
squeeze claim such as this, where the monopolist’s “retail price 
[remained] above cost,” would invite false positives and chill 
competition.255 Most significantly, the Court found that AT&T had 
no duty to deal with the plaintiffs256 and certainly possessed no 
obligation “to deal under terms and conditions that the rivals find 
commercially advantageous.”257 Although AT&T’s wholesale 
activities were federally mandated, the Court seemed to interpret the 
Aspen exception so narrowly that any duty to deal “arose from FCC 
regulations, not from the Sherman Act.”258 Troublingly, the Court 
reduced to a footnote another reason why AT&T might have lacked a 
duty to deal.259 The Court observed that an antitrust duty to deal 
would require a “showing of monopoly power, but . . . the market for 
high-speed Internet service is now quite competitive; DSL providers 
face stiff competition from cable companies and wireless and 
satellite providers.”260 This puzzling observation also seems to 
suggest that AT&T might not have possessed monopoly power in the 
relevant market, which would then have eliminated the possibility of 
a Section 2 violation.261 However, the Court moved on to focus more 
 
 253. Id. at 451–52. 
 254. Id. Critics of the decision argue that the Court overlooked the fact that suppliers with 
control over wholesale prices can accomplish anticompetitive results without even resorting to 
below-cost pricing that violates the Brooke Group standard. Meriwether, supra note 249, at 67. 
 255. See Linkline, 555 U.S. at 452 (citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.,  509  U.S.  209,  223  (1993))  (“[T]he  exclusionary  effect of prices above a relevant measure 
of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents 
competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control 
without courting intolerable  risks  of  chilling  legitimate  price  cutting.”). 
 256. Id. at 457 (stating that plaintiffs may not bring a price-squeeze claim under Section 2 
when the defendant monopolist has no antitrust duty to deal with the plaintiffs at wholesale). 
 257. Id. at 450. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 448 n.2. 
 260. Id. at 448. 
 261. Without a showing of monopoly power, the Court could have dismissed the claim 
without even inquiring into the viability of the plaintiff’s  price-squeeze claim. 
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heavily on the issue of whether a plaintiff could bring a price-
squeeze claim “when the defendant is under no antitrust obligation to 
sell the inputs to the plaintiff in the first place.”262 
Ultimately, the Court found that when an absolute refusal to deal 
would have been lawful, a firm should never face Section 2 liability 
for selling to a competitor at an unreasonable price.263 Furthermore, 
if a monopolist has no duty to deal with a competitor in the 
wholesale market, its price squeeze is not unlawful unless prices in 
the retail market are predatory or below an appropriate measure of 
cost, as defined by the Brooke Group test.264 The Court’s decision in 
Linkline effectively overruled a line of lower court decisions that 
interpreted Trinko to hold that plaintiffs could bring predatory-price- 
squeeze claims even where a monopolist had no duty to deal.265 
 
 262. Id. at 442. 
 263. Id. at 449–52. 
 264. Id. at 452; see White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 584 (1st Cir. 2011) (asserting 
that actions in the wholesale and retail markets cannot be conflated to produce an antitrust 
violation when there is no violation in either market alone). 
 265. E.g., Linkline Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 2007), 
rev’d  sub  nom.,  Pac.  Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Linkline  Commc’ns,  Inc.,  554  U.S.  916  (2008),  vacated 563 
F.3d  853  (9th  Cir.  2009);;  Covad  Commc’ns  Co.  v.  BellSouth  Corp.,  374  F.3d  1044,  1050  (11th  
Cir. 2004). Contra Covad  Commc’ns  Co.  v.  Bell  Atl.  Corp.  398  F.3d  666,  673  (D.C.  Cir.  2005);;  
Cavalier Tel., LLC v. Verizon Va., Inc. 330 F.3d 176, 190 (4th Cir. 2003). Two years later, in a 
unanimous vote, the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co. extended the Brooke Group predatory-pricing standard to predatory bidding claims. 549 U.S. 
312,  315  (2007).  Predatory  bidding  “involves  the  exercise  of  market  power  on  the  [market’s]  buy  
[],  or  input,  side.”  Id. at 320. A purchaser engaging in predatory bidding raises the market price of 
an input product so high that rival buyers cannot compete and must exit the market. Id. The 
purchaser,   now   in   possession   of   “monopsony   power,”   then   drives   down   input   prices   to   reap  
supracompetitive profits that offset its losses from bidding up high input prices. Id. at 320–21. 
The  Court  reasoned  that  predatory  bidding  claims  are  “analytically  similar”  to  predatory  pricing  
claims   and   that   “predatory   bidding   presents   less   of   a   direct   threat   of   consumer   harm   than 
predatory   pricing.”   Id. at 324; see Thomas A. Lambert, Weyerhaeuser and the Search for 
Antitrust’s  Holy  Grail, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 277, 289–91 (2007) (noting the similarities 
between predatory bidding and predatory pricing). But see John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and 
Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price 
Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 654–55 (2005) (noting the 
differences between predatory bidding and predatory pricing and arguing that the Brooke Group 
requirement of below-cost pricing should not apply to predatory bidding). While Weyerhaeuser 
represents   a   “significant   victory   for   antitrust   defendants”   in   the   realm   of   predatory   bidding  
claims, plaintiffs challenging pricing disparities at retail and wholesale levels face an uphill battle 
to demonstrate either an unlawful refusal to deal under the Aspen exception or below-cost pricing. 
Nickolai  G.  Levin,  Weyerhaeuser’s Implications for Future Antitrust Disputes, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 343, 353 (2007); see Linkline,   555  U.S.   at   452   (finding   plaintiffs’   claims   to   be   “nothing  
more than an amalgamation of a meritless claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the 
wholesale   level”   and   noting   that   “[i]f   there   is   no   duty   to   deal   at the wholesale level and no 
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B.  Predatory Pricing and 
Product Disparagement 
in the Lower Courts 
The Court’s analysis in Linkline demonstrates that a monopolist 
can price as it chooses so long as it prices above some level of cost266 
or has no duty to deal. This analysis of single-product predatory 
pricing claims has also been adopted in several recent district and 
circuit court decisions.267 Beyond this application, the rationale in 
Linkline has been expanded in some lower courts to preclude all 
pricing claims alleged under Section 2, as detailed in Part 1 of this 
Section. Part 2 explores how some courts have distinguished Linkline 
in order to keep Section 2 claims viable. 
1.  The Expansion of Linkline 
Notably, lower courts have significantly expanded the Court’s 
analysis in Linkline beyond its application to single-product 
predatory pricing. The Ninth Circuit in John Doe 1 v. Abbott 
Laboratories268 interpreted the Linkline decision to preclude Section 
2 challenges to all product-pricing claims.269 In that case, the 
plaintiffs represented “certified classes of HIV patients . . . who 
purchase[d] Norvir,” a drug manufactured by the defendant that 
scientists discovered “boosted” the effectiveness of HIV-fighting 
protease inhibitors (PIs) when combined in low doses with other 
PIs.270 The defendant held a monopoly on the “boosting” market via 
Norvir, but it also competed in the “boosted” PI market as a retailer 
of a boosted PI, Kaletra.271 After the Food and Drug Administration 
 
predatory pricing at the retail level, then a firm is certainly not required to price both of these 
services  in  a  manner  that  preserves  its  rivals'  profit  margins”). 
 266. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 267. E.g., Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle, S.A., 724 F. Supp. 2d 245, 271 (D.P.R. 2010) 
(describing  an   ice  cream  distributor’s  price-squeeze  claim  against   the  world’s   largest   ice  cream  
manufacturer  as  “toothless,”  and  observing  that   the  defendant’s  prices  were  not  being  set  above  
cost and that there was no demonstrated antitrust duty to deal), aff’d, 656 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 
2011); Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1207 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (rejecting allegations of monopolization because plaintiff, a manufacturer of trigger 
sprays,   failed   to  provide  evidence   that   the  defendant   rival  “ever  priced   its   trigger sprays below 
average  variable  cost”). 
 268. 571 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 269. Id. at 934–35. 
 270. Id. at 932. 
 271. Id. 
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began to permit other competitors to market Norvir as a booster for 
their PIs, the defendant increased the price of Norvir by 400 percent 
but maintained the price of Kaletra.272 According to the plaintiffs, the 
defendant leveraged its “boosting” monopoly in order to monopolize 
the “boosted” PI market by inducing consumers to purchase Kaletra 
over competitors’ PIs.273 The effect was an increased total cost of 
boosted PIs for competitors and an alleged overall impairment of 
competition in violation of Section 2.274 
The Ninth Circuit held that the reasoning in Linkline controlled 
its decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim of unlawful 
unilateral conduct.275 The court found “insubstantial” the difference 
between Abbott Laboratories’ sale to consumers in both the booster 
and boosted markets and the Linkline defendant’s transactions with 
both consumers and competitors in the retail and wholesale 
markets.276 The court made no distinction between Section 2 claims 
brought under theories of monopoly leveragingthat is, the use of 
monopoly in one market to create or maintain a separate monopoly 
in another market277and single-product price squeezing.278 Rather, 
it found the defendant’s price increase functionally equivalent to that 
of AT&T’s in Linkline and focused on the fact that the plaintiffs 
failed to allege that the defendant either refused to sell to them at the 
booster level or employed below-cost pricing at the boosted level.279 
Reiterating Linkline’s rhetoric that “[t]wo wrong claims do not make 
one that is right,”280 the court found “no independently cognizable 
 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 935. 
 276. Id. (“We   understand   the   difference,   but   it   is   insubstantial.   However   labeled,   Abbott’s  
conduct is the functional equivalent of the price squeeze the Court found unobjectionable in 
Linkline.”). 
 277. See generally Eun K. Chang, Expanding Definition of Monopoly Leveraging, 17 U. 
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 325 (2009) (discussing free-standing monopoly leveraging doctrine and 
exploring judicial division on whether monopoly leveraging violates Section 2). 
 278. Abbott Labs.,  571  F.3d  at  935.  Scholars  have  criticized  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  approach  in  
this case for   its   failure   to   employ   a   “bundled   discount”   analysis,   in  which  Norvir   and  Kaletra  
would be deemed separate productsrather than a single finished productsubject to a Linkline 
price-squeeze analysis. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 466 n.211 (2009). 
 279. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d at 935. 
 280. Id. at   934   (citing   Pac.   Bell   Tel.   Co.   v.   Linkline   Commc’ns,   Inc.,   555   U.S.   438,   457 
(2009)). 
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harm to competition when the wholesale price and retail price are 
independently lawful.”281 The Ninth Circuit reiterated its position 
two years later in a similar case involving the same defendants, 
Safeway, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,282 where different plaintiffs 
advanced monopoly-leveraging claims identical to those alleged by 
Doe.283 Finding that the decisions in Linkline and Doe precluded 
liability on a theory of monopoly leveraging, the court granted 
summary judgment on the issue.284 Only time will tell if the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of Linkline—as virtually eliminating 
challenges to all pricing of a monopoly product—is merely an 
outlier, or if other circuits will follow suit. 
2.  Distinguishing Linkline 
Not all lower courts have employed the same rationale toward 
all predatory pricing claims. Courts recognize that predatory pricing 
can take many forms, from bundling discounts and below-cost 
pricing to exclusive dealing and rebates, and some courts have used 
their discretion to restructure Section 2 claims in instances where 
Linkline’s precedent would require dismissal. For example, a 
California district court in Church & Dwight Co. v. Mayer 
Laboratories, Inc.285 rejected a “price-based claim” of predatory 
pricing but allowed the plaintiff’s Section 2 claim to survive the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss as a vertical restraint286 on grounds 
that “competition was substantially foreclosed.”287 There, the parties 
involved were manufacturers and distributors in the condom market, 
where competition depends heavily on point-of-sale advertising and 
acquisition of display space in retail stores.288 Mayer Laboratories, 
Inc. (“Mayer Labs”) alleged that monopolist Church & Dwight Co. 
 
 281. Id. at 934–35. 
 282. 761 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 283. Id. at 883. 
 284. Id. at 895–96. 
 285. No. C-10-4429 EMC, 2011 WL 1225912, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (noting that 
“[c]ourts  have  long  recognized  many  forms  of  exclusionary  conduct  that  do  not  involve  below-
cost  pricing”). 
 286. Vertical restraints arise when a manufacturer imposes restrictions on another entity, 
usually a retailer, in the chain of distribution of a project. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. 
Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2008). 
Vertical restraints are governed by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 287. Church & Dwight, 2011 WL 1225912, at *10–11. 
 288. Id. at *1. 
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(“C&D”) violated Section 2 by engaging in a rebate program with 
chain store retailers that required a specified minimum percentage of 
in-store display space dedicated to their products in exchange for 
massive rebates.289 Mayer Labs claimed that this reallocation of 
display space to C&D was not based on the merits, that Mayer Labs’ 
display space was diminished despite data showing that its condoms 
were selling better than   C&D’s, and that C&D’s rebates were 
intended to replace and reduce the visibility of competing brands.290 
Although one can draw parallels between the coercive conduct 
exhibited in this case and that of the defendant in Doe and Safeway, 
the court found the latter inapplicable.291 The court distinguished this 
case from Doe and Linkline on the grounds that the conduct at issue 
in those cases involved a pricing scheme that itself operated as an 
exclusionary tool.292 The central question, according to the court, 
was whether Mayer Labs’ claims alleged a “price-based claim” of 
predatory pricing.293 The court answered the inquiry in the negative, 
noting that the claim focused on the conditions and tactics employed 
at the exclusion of competitors.294 The court found that C&D’s 
rebates themselves did not exclude competition; rather, it was the 
exclusive display space bought through the rebates that increased 
C&D’s sales and aimed to monopolize the market.295 Drawing on the 
Sixth Circuit’s 2002 decision in Conwood Co. v. United States 
Tobacco,296 the Church & Dwight court asserted that a below-cost 
pricing analysis need not be employed where the alleged 
anticompetitive strategy sufficiently “constitute[s] willful 
anticompetitive conduct.”297 The circuit court in Conwood, a case 
that similarly involved point-of-sale displays as an important means 
of competition, found a defendant snuff monopolist liable under 
Section 2 because of its exclusive dealing arrangements and its 
practice of destroying, removing, and burying a smaller rival’s 
 
 289. Id. at *2. 
 290. Id. at *2–3. 
 291. Id. at *8–10. 
 292. Id. at *9. 
 293. Id. at *10. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 297. Church & Dwight, 2011 WL 1225912, at *10–11. 
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packages from visible display racks to encourage sales of its own 
snuff tobacco.298 The Conwood court condemned the monopolist’s 
misrepresentations to retailers about the sales strength of its products 
versus its competitors’ after it reduced competition in the 
monopolized market.299 
While Conwood differs from Church & Dwight because it 
involved “overly tortious means,” the district court in Church & 
Dwight found the negative effects on competition to be identical.300 
To support its decision to uphold Mayer Labs’s Section 2 claim, the 
Church & Dwight court distinguished Mayer Labs’s claim from 
cases where exclusion from display spaces did not constitute antitrust 
injuries by emphasizing that the display-space allocation in those 
cases was based on the merits of competition and the defendant’s 
market share of sales.301 In addition, no alternative means of 
marketing were significantly curtailed in those cases.302 Thus, 
Church & Dwight demonstrates that pricing strategies that 
significantly impair competitive opportunity and reduce consumer 
choice, when viewed cumulatively, may result in Section 2 liability. 
Nevertheless, the boundaries of such liability remain unclear,303 and 
there exists little consensus among federal courts about whether to 
condemn product disparagement under Section 2.304 
 
 298. 290 F.3d at 774–75, 778–79. However, the court noted that isolated tortious activity 
without a significant and lasting effect on competition does not constitute an antitrust violation. 
Id. at 783–84. 
 299. See id. at 785–91   (“[T]here  was  evidence   showing   that  USTC’s  actions  caused  higher  
prices  and  reduced  consumer  choice,  both  of  which  are  harmful  to  competition.”). 
 300. Church & Dwight, 2011 WL 1225912, at *11. 
 301. Id. at *11–13. 
 302. Id. at *13. 
 303. The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue, though it did state in Brooke Group 
that   malicious   conduct   among   competitors   “does   not,   without   more,   state   a   claim   under   the  
federal  antitrust  laws.”  Brooke  Grp.  Ltd.  v.  Brown  & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
225 (1993). But see LePage's Inc. v. 3M Co., 324 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2003) (characterizing 
Conwood as   “a   good   illustration   of   the   type   of   exclusionary conduct that will support a § 2 
violation”). 
 304. See Kevin S. Marshall, Product Disparagement Under the Sherman Act, Its Nurturing 
and Injurious Effects to Competition, and the Tension Between Jurisprudential Economics and 
Microeconomics, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 251 (2006) (arguing that intentionally false 
disparagement of a   rival’s   goods   or   services   injures   competition,   constituting   a   violation   of  
Section 2); Maurice E. Stucke, When a Monopolist Deceives, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 823, 826 (2010) 
(recognizing   that   “nearly every court [acknowledges] . . . that a monopolist's deceptive 
advertising and product disparagement under certain factual circumstances can violate the federal 
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Notably, the district court in Church & Dwight emphasized that 
an assessment of Mayer’s monopolistic conduct for potential liability 
must view that “conduct in the aggregate” to properly evaluate its 
“cumulative or synergistic effects.”305 Assertions of “cumulative 
effects in the aggregate,” also known as “overall schemes to 
monopolize,” are not novel.306 As far back as 1962, the Supreme 
Court stated that, in Sherman Act cases, “plaintiffs should be given 
the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the 
various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny 
of each.”307 Adding to this view, the plaintiffs in United States v. 
Microsoft Corp. urged a finding of liability where a monopolist’s 
unilateral campaign of exclusionary acts in the aggregate had the 
requisite impact, even if each individual act would be lawful.308 
The Church & Dwight court attempted to reconcile this 
approach with the Linkline Court’s rejection of an “amalgamation” 
of meritless claims by quickly noting that the Court’s analysis of 
“predatory pricing at the retail level took into account the pricing at 
the wholesale levelthe retail pricing was not below the elevated 
whole price.”309 While this cursory explanation is not wholly 
persuasive,310 other lower courts have held similarly in the context of 
predatory pricing schemes. For example, in In re Neurontin Antitrust 
 
antitrust  laws”  but  noting  that  lower  courts  employ  differing  legal  standards  to  evaluate  deceit  by  
a monopolist). 
 305. Church & Dwight, 2011 WL 1225912, at *16. 
 306. E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (acknowledging 
that   plaintiffs   asserted   a   “cumulative   effect”   argument   but   noting   no   evidence   of   acts   to   show  
course of conduct); Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1306–10 (D. Utah 
1999) (allowing plaintiff to pursue a Section 2 claim based on the course of conduct theory). 
 307. Cont’l  Ore  Co.  v.  Union  Carbide  & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962). 
 308. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 78. 
 309. Church & Dwight, 2011 WL 1225912, at *16. 
 310. The Court in Linkline strongly emphasized a divorced analysis of retail and wholesale 
prices, stating: 
Plaintiffs’   price-squeeze claim, looking to the relation between retail and wholesale 
prices, is thus nothing more than an amalgamation of a meritless claim at the retail 
level and a meritless claim at the wholesale level. If there is no duty to deal at the 
wholesale level and no predatory pricing at the retail level, then a firm is certainly not 
required to price both of   these   services   in   a   manner   that   preserves   its   rivals’   profit  
margins. 
Pac.  Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Linkline  Comm’ns,  Inc.,  555  U.S.  438,  452  (2009).  On  the  other  hand,  the  
Church & Dwight court’s  cursory  attempt  to  liken  its  analysis  to  that  in  Linkline fails to make a 
distinction between analyzing a price-squeeze claim and analyzing a combination of allegedly 
anticompetitive pricing practices. 
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Litigation,311 a New Jersey district court upheld the plaintiffs’ claims 
that the defendant “violated Section 2 . . . by engaging in an overall 
scheme to monopolize the market” for an anti-epilepsy drug.312 
Rather than alleging independent antitrust violations involving 
improper patent listings, the plaintiffs, direct purchasers of an 
epilepsy treatment drug manufactured by the defendant, successfully 
pursued a Section 2 claim based on an overall scheme that was 
“designed for the anticompetitive purpose” of obtaining more market 
exclusivity than permitted by patent laws. This forced plaintiffs and 
other purchasers to pay supracompetitive prices for the defendant’s 
patents.313 Moreover, the court asserted that courts may view a group 
of factual, but not legal, allegations in their totality.314 The district 
court distinguished Linkline as a case dealing “only with the viability 
of a price-squeeze claim in a particular factual situation and in a 
particular legal context.”315 In addition, the court found that the 
Linkline Court never indicated its intent to overrule preexisting 
standards that permit claims alleging schemes to monopolize.316 The 
district court’s willingness to find the plaintiff’s Section 2 claim 
viable demonstrates that some lower courts continue to resist the 
anti-interventionist rationale underlying Trinko and Linkline. 
V.  ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION 
AND HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS 
Much like actual monopolization, the doctrine of attempted 
monopolization was crafted in the absence of congressional guidance 
and remains one of the most “thought-provoking and unsettled” areas 
in modern antitrust law.317 Part A of this section sets forth the 
Supreme Court’s test for attempted monopolization and discusses the 
significance of Twombly’s heightened pleading standards in the 
context of Section 2. Part B examines the impact of these pleading 
 
 311. MDL No. 1479, 2009 WL 2751029 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 312. Id. at *16. 
 313. Id. at *13. 
 314. Id. at *16 (emphasis in original) (citing In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 
522, 528 (D.N.J. 2004)). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 213. 
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standards on attempted monopolization claims318 in recent lower 
federal court decisions. 
A.  Attempted Monopolization Claims 
in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan319 
held that attempted monopolization requires a plaintiff to show “(1) 
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive 
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power.”320 The first element 
refers to the same type of conduct required for actual monopolization 
and is naturally subject to the same limitations and questions 
discussed earlier.321 With respect to the second element, unlike the 
offense of actual monopolization, the analysis for attempted 
monopolization inquires into the defendant’s intent, asking “not why, 
but whether, one intends to acquire unlawful monopoly power.”322 
Courts have held that specific intent can be inferred from 
anticompetitive conduct but also have emphasized that no Section 2 
liability is likely to be found where a valid business reason exists for 
the alleged predatory or anticompetitive conduct.323 
The Spectrum Court imposed the third requirement of a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power in an effort to 
“avoid constructions of [Section] 2 which might chill competition, 
 
 318. See supra note 25. For a discussion of Twombly in the context of vertical restraints, see 
Nicole McGuire, An Antitrust Narcotic: How the Rule of Reason Is Lulling Vertical Enforcement 
to Sleep, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225 (2012), which discusses the difficulty plaintiffs face in 
surviving motions to dismiss as a result of Twombly’s  heightened  pleading  standard. 
 319. 506 U.S. 447 (1993). 
 320. Id. at  456.  To  clarify,  “a  company  that  does  not  possess  significant  market power at the 
time of anticompetitive conduct may . . . [be guilty of actual monopolization] if it obtains 
monopoly   power   as   a   result   of   that   conduct”;;   however,   “[i]f   the   conduct   does   not   result   in   a  
monopoly power, the company may be guilty of attempted monopolization.” Katarzyna A. 
Czapracka, Where Antitrust Ends and IP Beginson the Roots of the Transatlantic Clashes, 9 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 44, 50 (2007). Along with pleading the three elements given by Spectrum, 
private   plaintiffs  must   also   plead   “causal   antitrust   injury”   by   demonstrating   that   the   plaintiff’s  
loss  “flows  from  an  anticompetitive  aspect  or  effect  of  the  defendant’s  behavior.”  Rebel  Oil  Co.  
v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 321. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 322. Ass’n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577, 585 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (emphasis in original). 
 323. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459. 
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rather than foster it.”324 As the Court in Trinko highlighted eleven 
years later,325 the Court in Spectrum observed that “[i]t is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-
term anticompetitive effects.”326 Hinting at the problem of false 
positives, the Court emphasized that Section 2 only penalizes 
unilateral firm conduct that monopolizes or dangerously threatens to 
monopolize.327 Thus, the third requirement of a dangerous 
probability “reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the 
competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.”328 
In the last several years, heightened pleading standards imposed 
by the Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly329 
have made it more difficult for plaintiffs claiming attempted 
monopolization to allege the last two prongs. In Twombly, the 
plaintiffs alleged that Bell Atlantic and other incumbent local 
exchange carriers, which were bound by federal law to share their 
networks with smaller competitors, engaged in parallel conduct to 
inhibit their smaller rivals in violation of Section 1.330 The Twombly 
Court, in a seven–two decision, dismissed plaintiffs’ Section 1 
conspiracy complaint because it failed to include “plausible grounds 
to infer an agreement.”331 Countering the permissive pleading 
standards of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Court directed lower courts to require specific facts to support 
plaintiffs’ allegations.332 Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,333 the 
Court redoubled its stance, announcing that all civil complaints 
“must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’”334 
Although Section 2 claims of monopolization were not squarely 
at issue in these cases, lower federal courts have relied on the 
pleading standards dictated in Twombly and Iqbal in deciding cases 
 
 324. Id. at 455, 458. 
 325. Verizon  Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices  of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  540  U.S.  398,  414  (2004). 
 326. Id. at 458–59. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 456. 
 329. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 330. Id. at 550–51. 
 331. Id. at 556. 
 332. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 333. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 334. Id. at 1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
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involving attempted monopolization.335 After Twombly, courts may 
treat any assertion that a dominant firm possessed a particular 
intentor other fundamentally factual assertionsas a legal 
conclusion.336 Furthermore, a plaintiff’s attempt to demonstrate a 
defendant’s dangerous probability of success is more likely to fail if 
the plaintiff is unable to amass evidence of market share, barriers to 
entry, or the strength of existing competitors.337 In Twombly, the 
Court again manifested its skepticism about intervention by ill-
equipped courts and their ability to avoid false positives, noting that 
behind the decision was a desire to protect antitrust defendants from 
the heavy burdens of pretrial discovery.338 In his sharp dissent in 
Twombly, Justice John Paul Stevens wondered whether the decision 
“will benefit only defendants in antitrust treble-damages cases, or 
whether its test for the sufficiency of a complaint will inure to the 
benefit of all civil defendants . . . .”339 While it may be too soon to 
confidently announce that competition has been irreparably 
hampered, it appears that civil defendants facing allegations of 
 
 335. E.g., In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation, 502 F.3d 47, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that 
purchasers of elevators and elevator maintenance services failed to allege plausible inference of 
antitrust agreement); Shinogi Pharma, Inc. v. Mylan, Inc., No. Civ. A. 10-1077, 2011 WL 
2550835, at *1 (D. Del. June 10, 2011) (dismissing attempted monopolization counterclaim for 
failure to plead with specificity required by Twombly and Iqbal). 
 336. Briggs & Matheson, supra note 14, at 145. 
 337. Courts are to consider a combination of factors, such as the defendant's market share as a 
proxy for monopoly power, elasticity of consumer demand, entry barriers, and the nature of the 
defendant's anticompetitive conduct. Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 646 F. 
Supp. 2d 726, 735 (E.D. Penn. 2009). With respect to market share as an index for a dangerous 
probability of success,  the  higher  a  defendant’s  market  share,  the  more  likely  the  court  is  to  find  a  
dangerous probability of success. MONOPOLIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 222. An 
inelasticity of consumer demand, indicating that consumers will continue to purchase despite 
price increases, also increases the likelihood of a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly. 
Id. at 224. A finding of high or multiple barriers to entry, such as government regulations or high 
start-up costs, additionally indicates a higher probability of success. Id. at 225. Lastly, an 
assessment of the size and financial strength of competitors helps courts to evaluate whether a 
defendant has a dangerous probability of success. Id. at 225–26. Courts have held that deciding 
whether a defendant possesses a dangerous probability of monopolization is a fact-intensive 
inquiry. E.g., United  States  v.  Microsoft  Corp.,  253  F.3d  34,  80  (D.C.  Cir.  2011)  (“[T]he  court 
must examine the facts of each case, mindful that the determination of what constitutes an 
attempt . . .   is  a  question  of  proximity  and  degree.”  (citations  omitted)  (internal  quotation  marks  
omitted)); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 319 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 338. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–60 (2007); Mark Anderson & Max 
Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2010). 
 339. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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attempted monopolization will continue to benefit from Twombly’s 
stricter pleading standards. 
B.  Attempted Monopolization Meets 
Twombly in Lower Federal Courts 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly seemed to raise the 
bar for plaintiffs to plead adequate supporting facts for every element 
of their antitrust claims.340 Following the Court’s decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal, it appears that plaintiffs must overcome more 
hurdles to state a claim for attempted monopolization, because 
plaintiffs must now provide enough factual detail “to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” 
supporting the plaintiffs’ claims.341 
As Judge Learned Hand expressed in United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America,342 plaintiffs “must prove . . . an intent which goes 
beyond the mere intent to do the act”; there must be a specific aim to 
monopolize.343 Some commentators have speculated that fusing the 
specific intent requirement with Twombly’s requirement of factual 
allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”344 
results in particular difficulty for plaintiffs alleging specific intent 
because courts may treat factual assertions as legal conclusions.345 
However, a few courts have permitted plaintiffs’ claims to survive 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment in spite 
Twombly’s pleading standard.346 In   allowing   a   plaintiff’s  Section 2 
 
 340. See id. at  555  (“Factual  allegations  must  be  enough   to   raise  a   right   to   relief  above   the  
speculative  level.”). 
 341. Id. at 556. 
 342. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 343. Id. at 431–32. 
 344. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 345. Briggs & Matheson, supra note 14, at 145. 
 346. See e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 453 (4th Cir. 
2011) (inferring specific intent from the plaintiff’s   adequately pled anticompetitive practices); 
Broadcom  Corp.  v.  Qualcomm  Inc.,  501  F.3d  297,  318  (3d  Cir.  2007)  (noting  that  “evidence  that  
business  conduct  is  ‘not  related  to  any  apparent  efficiency’  may  constitute  proof  of  specific  intent  
to  monopolize”  (quoting Aspen Skiing, Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 
n. 39 (1985))); Scooter Store, Inc. v. SpinLife.com, LLC, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116–17 (S.D. 
Ohio 2011) (finding that the defendant’s  conduct, as alleged by the plaintiff, was employed  “to  
harass and eliminate competition is sufficient to establish a specific intent to monopolize at the 
motion  to  dismiss  stage”);;  Cloverleaf  Enters.,  Inc.  v.  Md.  Thoroughbred,  Horsemen's  Ass'n,  730  
F. Supp. 2d 451, 464–65 (D. Md. 2010) (stating that the plaintiffs’   factual   allegations  must  be  
accepted as true and could consequently support a finding that defendants had a specific intent to 
  
1158 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1105 
 
claims to proceed, these courts have echoed the Spectrum Sports 
Court’s observation that a fact finder could infer the necessary 
specific intent to monopolize from anticompetitive conduct.347 Some 
courts have additionally found that a defendant’s assertion of a valid 
business justification for the alleged anticompetitive conduct348 does 
not defeat a plaintiff’s attempted monopolization claim.349 
Plaintiffs appear to encounter the most difficulty in motions to 
dismiss, where the requirement of a dangerous probability of 
successful monopolization intersects with Twombly’s pleading 
standard. Attempted monopolization by nature requires a “lesser 
degree of market power” to establish a monopolization claim.350 
Some lower courts have sustained plaintiffs’ attempted 
monopolization claims, holding that the fact-specific nature of the 
relevant market inquiry makes courts reluctant to dismiss Section 2 
claims for failure to properly plead a relevant market.351 However, 
several other district and circuit courts have interpreted the Twombly 
and Iqbal decisions to require, or at least to strongly urge, plaintiffs 
to allege that the defendants controlled a certain percentage of the 
market and to describe the market structure.352 
 
monopolize the relevant wagering market); White Mule Co. v. ATC Leasing Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 
869, 893 (N.D. Ohio 2008)  (noting  that  “a  factfinder  could  also  reasonably  infer  a  specific  intent  
to destroy competition from the . . .   defendants'   conduct”   (quoting  Tops  Mkts.,   Inc.   v.  Quality  
Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babyage.com, 
Inc. v. Toys "R'' Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585–586 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (finding allegations of 
defendant’s   procurement   of   contractual   agreements   from  manufacturers   sufficient   to   constitute  
specific intent to monopolize); Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis. Int'l, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372, 390 
n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding allegations sufficient to state a claim for attempted 
monopolization). 
 347. See cases cited supra note 337. 
 348. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993). 
 349. See, e.g., All Star Carts & Vehicles, Inc. v. BFI Canada Income Fund, 596 F. Supp. 2d 
630, 642 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 350. See Tops Mkts., 142 F.3d at 100. 
 351. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 
392, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (upholding attempted monopolization claim). 
 352. See Process Controls Int'l, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt., 753 F. Supp. 2d 912, 927–28 
(E.D. Mo. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff failed to support its conclusion about the defendant’s  
control of the market with any factual allegations from which it could be reasonably inferred that 
defendant   “maintain[ed]   a   dominant   share   of   the   relevant  market”);;   Sun  Microsystems, Inc. v. 
Versata Enters., Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395, 403 (D. Del. 2009) (quoting Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. 
Domino’s   Pizza,   Inc,   124   F.3d   430,   436   (3d   Cir.   1997)) (granting the defendant’s   motion   to  
dismiss where the plaintiff relied on conclusory assertions and failed to allege facts pertaining to 
the   defendant’s   share   of   the  market,   the   boundaries   of   the   relevant  market,   or   the   “reasonable  
interchangeability”  of  the  product’s  use);;  Hear-Wear Techs., LLC v. Oticon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 
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Twombly’s stricter requirements, which came into effect in 
2007, took a massive toll on antitrust case filings.353 From 2008 to 
2009, the number of antitrust class action lawsuits filed in federal 
court dropped from 766 to 375.354 While lower federal courts 
continue to uphold attempted monopolization claims when alleged 
with specificity, Twombly has undoubtedly impacted the level of 
specificity with which plaintiffs must now plead Section 2 violations. 
VI.  ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS: 
“GET OUT OF JAIL FREE” CARDS FOR ALL 
In 2009, newly appointed Assistant Attorney General Christine 
Varney of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division touted the 
government’s renewed dedication to reinvigorate antitrust 
enforcement.355 In her inaugural weeks, Varney cautioned that “too 
big to fail”the idea that the collapse of institutions integral to the 
overall stability of the economy would result in disastrous economic 
consequences356is a “failure of antitrust.”357 Reflecting on the 
economic crisis afflicting the United States and countries around the 
globe, Varney announced, “The recent developments in the 
marketplace should make it clear that we can no longer rely upon the 
marketplace alone to ensure that competition and consumers will be 
protected.”358 Stricter antitrust enforcement efforts would require 
 
1272, 1280 (N.D. Okla. 2008) (denying the defendant’s  motion   to   dismiss   where   the plaintiff 
addressed with factual specificity important factors such as cross-elasticity of demand and 
interchangeability of products, peculiar characteristics, and unique barriers to entry). 
 353. Donald W. Hawthorne, Recent Trends in Federal Antitrust Class Action Cases, 
ANTITRUST, Summer 2010, at 58. 
 354. Id. 
 355. See Christine   A.   Varney,   Assistant   Att’y   Gen.,   U.S.   Dep’t   of   Justice,   Remarks   as  
Prepared for U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging 
Era 5 (May 12, 2009). 
 356. See Caren Bohan, Obama Aide: No Fixed Rules on Too Big to Fail, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 
2008, 9:00 a.m. ET), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-usa-politics-obama-financial-
idUSN1749089920080918; see also Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail—Too Small to Compete: 
Systemic Risk Should Be Addressed Through Antitrust Law But Such a Solution Will Only Work if 
It Is Applied on an International Basis, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 31,  34  (2010)  (asserting  that  “years  of  
deregulation coupled with consolidation in the financial services sector due to a lack of antitrust 
enforcement  resulted”  in  too-big-to-fail firms). 
 357. See David Goldman, Obama Vows Antitrust Crackdown, CNN MONEY (May 11, 2009, 
3:35 p.m. ET), http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/11/news/economy/antitrust/. 
 358. See Press   Release,   U.S.   Dep’t   of   Justice,   Justice   Department   Withdraws   Report   on  
Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
press_releases/2009/245710.pdf. 
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going “back to the basics” and employing “tried and true standards 
that set forth clear limitations on how monopoly firms are permitted 
to behave.”359 Many observers and antitrust commentators who 
hoped that Varney would spark a wave of stricter antitrust 
enforcement practices welcomed her appointment.360 From 2001 to 
2010, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had not filed a 
single action charging a monopolist with engaging in anticompetitive 
conduct in violation of Section 2.361 Although in 2008, under the 
Bush Administration, the DOJ issued a 215-page report attempting to 
lay out clear policy guidelines for determining monopolizing 
conduct, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rejected the report 
and Varney eventually rescinded it.362 The FTC characterized the 
DOJ’s report as “a blueprint for radically weakened enforcement,”363 
while Varney found that the report raised too many hurdles to 
government enforcement.364 
In retrospect, the government’s heightened focus on 
enforcement spearheaded by Varney ultimately amounted to more 
rhetoric than action, at least in the realm of Section 2. It took two 
years for the DOJ under President Obama to file United States v. 
 
 359. Varney, supra note 355, at 9. 
 360. See Stacey Anne Mahoney, To Day 100 and Beyond: Antitrust Enforcement in the 
Obama Administration, ANTITRUST COUNSELOR, Mar. 2009, available at http://www.gibson 
dunn.com/publications/Documents/Mahoney-Day100andBeyondAntitrustEnforcementObama 
Admin.pdf  (“In  other  words,  buckle  your  seatbelts,  corporate  America;;  it’s  going  to  be  a  bumpy,  
enforcement-laden   ride.”); Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Justice   Stevens’   Antitrust  
Legacy, ANTITRUST,   Summer   2010,   at   32,   36   (observing   that   the   Justice   Department’s   new 
pledge  to  aggressive  enforcement  may  “bring  Aspen in  from  the  ‘outer  boundary  § 2  liability’  to  
which it was consigned by Trinko”);;  Editorial,  Return of the Trustbusters, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
2009, at A30 (“So  it  is  heartening  to  see  that  the  Obama  Administration plans to start vigorously 
enforcing  antimonopoly  laws  again.”). 
 361. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2001–2010, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST 
DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2001–2010]. It was not until February 25, 2011, that the 
DOJ filed a complaint against the largest healthcare services provider in Wichita Falls, Texas, 
alleging that it unlawfully engaged in exclusive contracts to maintain its monopoly, causing 
consumers to pay higher prices. See Press Release, U.S.   Dep’t   of   Justice,   Justice   Department  
Reaches Settlement with Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health 
Insurers (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2011/267648.pdf 
[hereinafter Feb. 25, 2011, DOJ Press Release]. 
 362. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008); see Varney, supra note 355, at 8. 
 363. Statement of Comm’rs Harbour, Leibowitz, and Rosch, Fed.   Trade   Comm’n (Sept. 8, 
2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmt.pdf. 
 364. Varney, supra note 355, at 8–9. 
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United Regional Healthcare System,365 its first Section 2 
monopolization claim, in February 2011.366 In comparison to the 
Bush Administration’s Section 2 enforcement policy (or 
nonenforcement policy),367 United Regional represented a strong 
assertion of the U.S. government’s disapproval of unfair 
competition.368 In the first Section 2 claim brought by the 
government since 1999, the DOJ alleged that United Regional, the 
largest hospital in Wichita Falls, Texas, unlawfully used contracts to 
maintain its monopoly on hospital services.369 The case settled in 
September 2011 with United Regional agreeing to stop conditioning 
its prices on the basis of whether insurers contracted with its 
rivals.370 In the same period, Varney stepped down from her position, 
stating, “I came in with President Obama committed to fulfilling his 
promise to reinvigorate antitrust law, and I think we’ve done that.”371 
However, the department’s failure to reissue a revised report on 
single-firm conduct guidelines and its single Section 2 filing against 
United Regional seem to signal otherwise. 
VII.  CHANGING THE GAME: 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Against the backdrop of a severe global economic downturn, the 
lower federal courts’ discordant interpretations of Trinko’s refusal-
to-deal rules and the uncertainty surrounding standards governing 
other forms of predatory or exclusionary behavior indicate that 
change is necessary. Judicial coherence on Section 2 issues is needed 
now more than ever if the Sherman Act is to be the “Magna Carta of 
 
 365. Complaint, United States v.  United  Reg’l  Health  Care   Sys.,  No. 7:11-cv-00030 (N.D. 
Tex. Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f267600/267651.pdf. 
 366. See ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2001–2010, supra note 361. 
 367. J.  Bruce  McDonald,  Deputy  Assistant  Att’y  Gen.,  Dep’t  of Justice, Presentation to the 
American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section Annual Spring Meeting, Section 2 in the 
Second Bush Administration, 2005 WL 5327724 (Mar. 31, 2005) (reiterating its position that it is 
“preferable   to  allow  the  case   law  and  economic analysis to develop further and to await a case 
with  a  record  better  adapted  to  development  of  an  appropriate  standard”  (quoting  Brief  of  United  
States as Amicus Curiae at 19, 3M Co. v.  LePage’s   Inc.,   542  U.S.   953   (2004)   (No.   02-1865), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f203900/203900.pdf). 
 368. See ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS, FY 2001–2010, supra note 361. 
 369. Feb. 25, 2011, DOJ Press Release, supra note 361. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Thomas Catan & Gina Chon, Antitrust Chief to Step Down, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 7, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303544604576430171298566868.html. 
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free enterprise.”372 Enforcement efforts, crucial to maintaining the 
effectiveness of Section 2, remain stunted without a cohesive and 
receptive judiciary. Thus, this Article proposes fundamental change 
for a genuinely reinvigorated Section 2 and examines three potential 
avenues to meaningful reform. Part A of this section considers, but 
ultimately rejects, more radical reform of the market definition 
process. Part B attempts to address the need for a single unifying test 
to evaluate Section 2 claims alleging exclusionary or predatory 
conduct by presenting a modified rule of reason approach, which 
would additionally address judicial concerns about false positives 
and the proper role of the judiciary. Part C advances the viability of 
using Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as a “gap-
filler” in instances where a certain practice may not constitute a 
Section 2 violation but nonetheless results in harm to consumers. 
Lastly, Part D suggests that the changing nature of technology and 
business requires the Court to return to an Aspen-style analysis of 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct. 
A.  Reconsidering the 
Market Definition Process 
In 1966, the Supreme Court in Grinnell established the basic 
two-step framework for evaluating Section 2 claims.373 Since then, 
the vast majority of courts have required a finding of monopoly 
power before examining a defendant’s alleged exclusionary or 
predatory conduct.374 Over the years, many commentators have 
reflected on the flaws inherent in the process of defining the 
dominant firm’s share of the relevant geographic and product 
markets in order to make inferences about its market power.375 In 
2010, Professor Louis Kaplow advanced a thesis arguing that “the 
 
 372. Verizon  Commc’ns   Inc.   v.   Law  Offices   of  Curtis  V.  Trinko,  LLP,  540  U.S.   398,   415  
(2004) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)). 
 373. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see discussion supra Part II. 
 374. See supra Part II.A. 
 375. See Kaplow, supra note 40, at 440  (“No  one  believes  that  the  market  definition  process  
is flawless or that market power inferences drawn from market shares are uniformly reliable, or 
even   nearly   so.”); see, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, 
Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849 
(2000); Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated 
Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1984); Thomas E. Kauper, The Problem of Market Definition 
Under EC Competition Law, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1682 (1997). 
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market definition process is incoherent as a matter of basic economic 
principles and hence should be abandoned entirely.”376 In his 
intriguing conceptual claim, Kaplow contends that it is impossible to 
define a relevant market coherently unless the court already has a 
best estimate in mind, in which case the entire inference is worthless 
because “one already knows the answer to the market power question 
that the market definition process is designed to illuminate.”377 While 
cautioning that his thesis is primarily a conceptual matter advanced 
to generate new perspectives, Kaplow suggests a “temporizing” 
solution that would avoid having to resort to the traditional market 
definition in order to choose the market, thus yielding the best legal 
conclusion. Kaplow suggests that courts use “whatever evidence and 
modes of inference” to garner a best estimate of market power.378 
However, it becomes immediately clear that the “best evidence” 
from which to deduce market power remains unsettled, and Kaplow 
goes no further in this suggestion. This vague proposal, coupled with 
Kaplow’s acknowledgement that case law contains an 
“overwhelming endorsement” of the market power definition, further 
reduces the plausibility that “existing practice could adapt 
substantially if agencies and adjudicators were receptive.”379 
Furthermore, in light of the Court’s decision in Twombly, it 
seems that Kaplow’s altered analysis might be inconsistent with 
redefined pleading standards. Twombly arguably entrenched the 
importance of the market definition process.380 As illustrated in Part 
V, Twombly’s pleading standards make it easier for courts to deny 
pretrial discovery and to strike down claims for failure to 
demonstrate market power.381 In addition, the weight of stare decisis 
makes it more difficult to envision the Supreme Court entirely 
abandoning the market definition process in its evaluation of Section 
2 claims.382 While Kaplow’s argument does not persuasively argue 
 
 376. Kaplow, supra note 40, at 438.   The   “market   definition   process”   refers   to   a   three-step 
process in which one first defines the relevant market, typically referring to the product and 
geographic  markets.  Next,   “one  measures   the   firm’s  market   share”   in   contrast   to   others   in   the  
market. Lastly,  “one  infers  from  this  share  the  firm’s  degree  of  market  power.”  See id. at 439. 
 377. Id. at 441–42, 515. 
 378. Id. at 508–09, 511. 
 379. Id. at 508, 511. 
 380. See supra Part V. 
 381. See supra Part V. 
 382. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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that federal courts are anywhere near ready to relinquish their 
attachment to the market power definition, his proposal to eliminate 
such an integral part of antitrust analyses serves as a reinvigorating 
reminder that Section 2 analyses and enforcement strategies might 
benefit from more-than-incremental reform. 
B.  A Modified Rule of Reason 
Courts strive to apply legal tests that minimize false positives in 
order to achieve the end goals of economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare. In order to advance these objectives, FTC Commissioner 
Rosch advocates the application of a single test with which courts 
can analyze alleged monopolizing behavior, even if the test is 
imperfect and would not apply to all cases.383 A single test would 
provide more predictability to practitioners and more guidance to 
lower courts and enforcement agencies, and it would contribute to a 
more uniform development of antitrust law.384 Thus, this Article 
advances a “modified” rule of reason approach that allows courts to 
compare legal frameworks to find the legal test that most effectively 
improves consumer welfare in the case at hand.385 As discussed 
above, the rule of reason approach involves balancing 
procompetitive justifications for the alleged monopolizing conduct 
against its alleged anticompetitive effects.386 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court laid out the workings of 
the rule of reason approach in a Section 2 case, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp.,387 even though the test routinely applied exclusively 
in Section 1 cases.388 Instead of balancing a monopoly’s alleged 
anticompetitive effects against its procompetitive justifications, 
 
 383. Rosch, supra note 57, at 14–15 (proposing a test that would analyze anticompetitive 
effects by examining whether the intent of firms with monopoly or near-monopoly power is to 
cripple or eliminate rivals, and whether the conduct has that effect). 
 384. Id. at 15. 
 385. See generally Mark S. Popofsky, Section 2, Safe Harbors, and the Rule of Reason, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1265 (2008) (arguing that the use of the rule of reason in Section 2 claims 
requires adopting different legal tests depending on the circumstances and that courts should 
engage   in   a   balancing   of   such   tests   with   certain   “safe   harbors”—meaning that when certain 
factors are present, the conduct is lawful under Section 2 without further scrutiny—to better serve 
competition and consumers). 
 386. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 387. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 388. Id.; see discussion supra Part II.B. 
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courts employing a “modified” rule of reason approach must 
examine the procompetitive and anticompetitive consequences of 
each legal test proposed by the parties to the claim.389 Examples of 
legal tests include the aforementioned no-economic-sense test, profit-
sacrifice test, and less-efficient-rival test, all of which aim to 
determine whether the anticompetitive effects of a monopolist’s 
conduct outweigh the monopolist’s procompetitive justifications.390 
In the course of deciding which proposal to adopt, courts would 
have to determine a number of factors about each test, separately and 
comparatively: (1) enforcement costs; (2) the increase or diminution 
of false positives; (3) the ease of applicability; (4) likely competitive 
consequences; and (5) whether courts are likely to have all necessary 
information to apply the proposed test accurately.391 In weighing 
these considerations, courts would be able to select a legal test that 
best diminishes the risk of false positives. Indeed, the ultimate goal 
of a modified rule of reason approach would be to encourage courts 
to find the best legal test to minimize error under the circumstances. 
Where the “means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate 
competition, are myriad,” legal tests should be flexible enough to 
address the nuances of any Section 2 claim.392 However, the 
modified rule of reason approach would not apply where courts have 
settled on an appropriate Section 2 legal test to address a particular 
category of conductsuch as Brooke Group’s two-prong test for 
single-product predatory pricing.393 
Consistent with FTC Commissioner Rosch’s suggestion,394 this 
modified rule of reason approach possesses the flexibility needed to 
address the heterogeneous conduct subject to Section 2. Clearly, this 
approach to identifying the proper test necessarily requires courts to 
determine a great deal of information and, at first glance, seems to 
echo a concern prominently manifested in the Trinko 
decisionnamely, that courts are “ill-suited” to “act as central 
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of 
 
 389. See Popofsky, supra note 385, at 1274. 
 390. See supra Part II.B. 
 391. See Popofsky, supra note 385, at 1276–77. 
 392. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58. 
 393. See Popofsky, supra note 385, at 1277. 
 394. Rosch, supra note 57, at 14–15. 
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dealing.”395 However, upon closer examination, the task required by 
the modified rule of reason does not require courts to conduct any 
novel analyses.396 While it does require courts to carefully consider 
two proposed legal tests and their associated errors and 
consequences, courts balance the same factors, seek to diminish false 
positives, and make identical calculations regarding anticompetitive 
effects when evaluating virtually every Section 2 claim. Moreover, 
just six months after the Trinko Court doubted the capacity of lower 
courts to handle complex antitrust analyses, the Court in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,397 entrusted lower 
courts with precisely that role by noting that “[a]s courts gain 
experience considering the effects of these restraints by applying the 
rule of reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the 
litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate 
anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more 
guidance to businesses.”398 Although Leegin involved a Section 1 
claim, the Court’s observation may apply to courts conducting 
similar analyses of Section 2 claims. 
Ultimately, a modified rule of reason approach would preserve 
the existing array of tests to evaluate unilateral conduct in Section 2 
claims, and it would allow courts to employ the test that best reduces 
false positives by giving them the power to carefully consider and 
choose the best, though imperfect, option. 
C.  Falling Back on Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
While some commentators argue that there is an urgent need for 
more vigorous government intervention399 and others more 
temperately endorse a more balanced federal enforcement policy,400 
 
 395. Verizon  Commc’ns  Inc.  v.  Law  Offices  of  Curtis  V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
 396. See Popofsky, supra note 385,   at   1277   (“Fortunately,   the   common-law process of 
developing Section 2 does not take place on a clean slate . . . . The existence of background legal 
tests   greatly   aids   courts’   tasks   because   such   tests   provide   a   starting   point   for   the   analysis,   a  
baseline  against  which  to  assess  whether  a  different  legal  test  is  warranted.”). 
 397. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 398. Id. at 898. 
 399. See J. Thomas Rosch, The Redemption of a Republican, FTC: WATCH, June 1, 2009, at 
5–6, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090601redemption.pdf. 
 400. See Bonny E. Sweeney, An Overview of Section 2 Enforcement and Developments, 2008 
WIS. L. REV. 231, 259–60 (2008). 
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it is apparent that improvements in antitrust law critically depend on 
dynamic enforcement strategies. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court’s anti-expansionist perspective on Section 2 has constrained 
what the DOJ can do about single-firm conduct.401 However, Section 
5 of the FTC Act may provide added support to the prosecution of 
monopolization claims. 
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”402 The FTC has no authority to 
prosecute Section 2 claims but routinely uses Section 5 to challenge 
the same conduct that would violate the Sherman Act.403 In fact, 
Congress passed the FTC Act in 1914 with the belief that the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act much too strictly.404 
However, it granted the FTC only the authority to issue prospective 
remedies because it intended for “Section 5 to reach novel or 
incipient conduct.”405 The Supreme Court has also recognized that 
the FTC, in pursuing claims under Section 5, has broad powers to 
find trade practices illegal.406 
Despite this seemingly broad mandate to prosecute 
anticompetitive behavior under Section 5, the FTC’s power to 
challenge anticompetitive business practices has been curtailed by 
three circuit level decisions in which lower courts were unwilling to 
accept the FTC’s judgment about whether allegedly anticompetitive 
practices, which did not rise to the level of Section 2 violations, 
 
 401. See Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 311 (2010) (noting that enforcement agencies may hesitate to bring suit to 
minimize the risk of losing and eliciting more undesirable judicial precedent); James Langenfeld 
& Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of US Federal Antitrust Enforcement: Learning from Past and 
Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 11, 15 (2007) (predicting few Section 2 enforcement 
actions,  absent  a  “substantial  change  in  policy,  court  decisions, or empirical . . .  analysis”). 
 402. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 403. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r,  Fed.  Trade  Comm’n,  Remarks  at   the  New  York  State  Bar  
Association Annual Antitrust Conference, The Great Doctrinal Debate: Under What 
Circumstances Is Section 5 Superior to Section 2?, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/110127barspeech.pdf). 
 404. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 871, 873 (2010). 
 405. Rosch, supra note 403, at 9. 
 406. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 242, 244 (1972) (noting that the 
FTC  has  the  authority  to  “consider  []  public  values  beyond  simply  those  enshrined  in  the  letter  or  
encompassed  in  the  spirit  of  the  antitrust  laws”). 
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would lead to anticompetitive harm to consumers.407 The circuit 
courts feared that the vague language in Section 5 would lead to 
arbitrary enforcement and a blurred “distinction between guilty and 
innocent commercial behavior.”408 
While these concerns have effectively tempered the FTC’s use 
of Section 5 in potential Section 2 cases, FTC Commissioner Rosch 
argues that Section 5 generally acts as a more effective mechanism 
than Section 2 for resolving unsettled questions of law and alleviates 
the worry of creating negative precedent in Section 2 
jurisprudence.409 Specifically, Section 5 may prove to be a favorable 
channel in “hard” cases in which existing Section 2 precedent may 
lead a court to find that a firm is not liable for allegedly unfair 
methods of competition. To put it as Rosch described: “[I]f [the 
FTC] shoehorn[s] the facts of the case into a Sherman Act 
framework, we run the risk of either making bad law (to bring an 
unusual case within the ambit of existing precedent), or alternatively, 
losing the case even though the firm’s conduct is causing 
anticompetitive effects.”410 Such practice would not be “ducking” 
bad law; rather, it would be “using [the FTC’s] authority to reach a 
particular category that the Sherman Act generally did not and 
should not reach.”411 
One example in which this approach might have been more 
useful is the District of Columbia Circuit Court’s decision in Rambus 
Inc. v. FTC,412 which involved a memory chip manufacturer accused 
of deceptively failing to disclose patent information.413 Deception 
and failure to disclose patent information may fall under Section 5 of 
the FTC Act; however, the FTC pursued the monopolization claim 
under Section 2.414 In 2008, the circuit court held that the FTC failed 
to prove that Rambus engaged in exclusionary conduct and 
 
 407. See E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise 
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980); Amy Marshak, Note, The Federal Trade Commission on the Frontier: 
Suggestions for the Use of Section 5, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1132–33 (2011). 
 408. Marshak, supra note 407, at 1134 (quoting Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at 582). 
 409. Rosch, supra note 403, at 2–3. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. at 5. 
 412. 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 413. Id. at 458–59. 
 414. See id. at 467. 
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unlawfully monopolized the market,415 thus illustrating how a court 
of appeals can rein in the FTC without any obligation of deference. 
While the court expressly conceded that claims involving deception 
could be pursued under Section 2,416 according to former FTC 
Commissioner Leary, the FTC could have benefited by framing the 
alleged monopolizing conduct as a pure Section 5 claim because a 
court may have viewed a novel claim with more deference.417 
Furthermore, some scholars have observed that “[t]he FTC’s 
institutional mission and structure, as well as the broad substantive 
reach and limited enforcement mechanisms of [S]ection 5, make the 
FTC uniquely suited to take the lead in shaping the future of antitrust 
law.”418 Structurally, the FTC possesses advantages over the federal 
court system. As a specialized agency with its own antitrust experts 
and magistrates,419 the FTC has investigatory authority to request 
documents or compel information sharing through compulsory 
process.420 FTC proceedings are also governed by more permissive 
rules of evidence and procedure and do not use juries.421 Notably, 
Twombly’s burdensome pleading standards would not apply in FTC 
proceedings, thereby permitting the FTC’s investigation to proceed 
“on a more general, reasonable-belief standard.”422 Upon a hearing 
on the merits of the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the FTC has the 
power to issue injunctions or cease-and-desist orders and may seek 
civil penalties or injunctions in the event that a party violates the 
order.423 Although Section 5 of the FTC Act does not include a 
private right of action, it stands poised to grow into a powerful 
mechanism for redressing anticompetitive harm.424 
 
 415. Id. at 464; Marshak, supra note 407, at 1146. 
 416. See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464. 
 417. See Marshak, supra note 407, at 1147 (citing Thomas B. Leary, A Suggestion for the 
Revival of Section 5, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2009, at 3–4). 
 418. Id. at 1159. 
 419. Hovenkamp, supra note 404, at 876. 
 420. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 
153–56 (2007). 
 421. Hovenkamp, supra note 404, at 877. 
 422. Id. 
 423. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (l) (2006). 
 424. Rosch, supra note 403, at 8. 
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D.  Broadening the Scope of 
Section 2 Liability 
As evidenced by the federal courts’ hesitance to impose Section 
2 liability, the end goals of economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare have been shrouded in the mist of false positives and judicial 
burdens. Rather than engage in a careful balancing of efficiency 
justifications, the Court has tended to substantially scale back 
liability, leaving a wide range of conduct in limbo. The Trinko 
decision in particular has left the state of refusals to deal in 
disarray.425 Taking cues from Trinko, some lower courts have even 
eliminated the need for a monopolist to assert valid business 
justifications for its allegedly monopolizing acts.426 This undermines 
the purpose of Section 2 altogether and renders antitrust laws 
meaningless: without need to justify its actions, a monopolist is free 
to pursue any course that aligns with a rational profit motive, 
regardless of anticompetitive harm. Ultimately, it appears that the 
danger of false positives has weighed heavily in the Court’s 
approach. 
However, it seems increasingly shortsighted to apply outmoded, 
disjointed standards of Section 2 scrutiny in a new millennium 
defined by rapidly evolving technology, novel ways of doing 
business online and abroad, and new methods of harnessing greater 
wealth.427 Both massive corporations and smaller businesses are 
becoming more sophisticated with the use of new technology and 
online tools that broaden their reach and grow their resources.428 As 
one commentator noted, “[A]ntitrust laws are anachronisms when 
 
 425. See supra Part III. 
 426. See, e.g., Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 
2009); Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
 427. See Jonathan B. Baker, Can Antitrust Keep Up?: Competition Policy in High-Tech 
Markets, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 2011, at 16–19, available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
articles/2001/winter_regulation_baker.aspx; Peter T. Barbur et al., Market Definition in Complex 
Internet Markets, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 285  (2011)  (noting  that  the  growth  of  technology,  “rapid  
innovation, and unstable market shares ha[ve] made the prevailing [antitrust] analytical 
structure . . .  seem  anachronistic”). 
 428. See L. Gordon Crovitz, The Antitrust Anachronism, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2009 11:00 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204313604574326250751120772.html. 
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applied to industries of constant innovation.”429 Moreover, 
increasingly competitive market structures often arise as a result of 
technological advances or changing consumer demand patterns.430 
With these considerations in mind, the Court and, more importantly, 
the public would benefit from a return to the principles laid out in 
Aspen, which left open several possibilities through which a court 
may find liability.431 Returning to standards set forth in Aspen would 
provide courts with the flexibility essential to more comprehensive 
analyses of contemporary cases. As referenced above, the Court in 
Leegin entrusted courts with sophisticated calculations, so it remains 
unclear why courts evaluating Section 2 claims would be unable to 
conduct the same task.432 While simplistic in theory, this approach 
supports the notion that the protection of consumers and the 
promotion of free-market competition require a more receptive 
judiciary than Trinko permits. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Effectively addressing the incongruence of Section 2 
jurisprudence requires patience for fragmented rules and a 
willingness to consider a variety of legal tests to identify solutions 
with the lowest risk of overdeterrence. Ironically, even the world’s 
most commercially successful board game, Monopoly, has 
undergone interesting reform in adapting to the new century.433 
Among many changes, the railroads have been transformed into 
airports, the electric company has become a cell phone service, the 
water works turned into an internet service provider, and all property 
 
 429. Id.; accord Salil K. Mehra, Paradise Is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and User 
Dynamism, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889,  914  (2011)  (“From  a  practical  standpoint,  antitrust  law,  
as  it  is  conducted  in  the  United  States,  is  unlikely  to  work  well  or  faster  on  the  Internet.”). 
 430. Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 683, 728 (2011) (suggesting that consumers and industry would benefit from a rebalancing 
of antitrust and regulation). 
 431. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); see discussion 
supra Part III.A. 
 432. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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2006. See Erik Arneson, Monopoly Here & Now–United States Edition, ABOUT.COM GUIDE, 
http://boardgames.about.com/od/monopoly/a/here_and_now.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); 
Monopoly History and Fun Facts, HASBRO, http://www.hasbro.com/monopoly/en_US/discover/ 
history.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
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values and rents are 10,000 times more expensive.434 Passing “Go” 
gives a player two million dollars instead of two hundred, and a 
carton of McDonald’s french fries serves as a game piece.435 A 
reflection of American culture and a gauge of societal trends, this 
new version of Monopoly provides excellent fodder for reflection on 
the drastic evolution of the economy and the role of antitrust law 
within it. It is time that antitrust laws evolve with the changing 
global economic climate, and as one commentator recently urged, 
antitrust “should not be . . . silent at a time when economic crisis 
looms large.”436 
Section 2 is an area of law that will never achieve a level of 
great clarity because anticompetitive harms cannot be directly 
measured. However, in the last several years, the Supreme Court has 
done little to clarify Section 2 or further the goals of consumer 
welfare and economic efficiency that are fostered by robust 
competition. In addition, the Court’s narrow holdings and 
intimidating warnings about false positives have contributed to 
dissonance in the lower federal courts and higher barriers for private 
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court should take steps to clarify the Trinko 
decision, although the optimal solution would be for the Court to 
adopt a more cohesive stance on different forms of monopolizing 
conduct, if not a single unifying test. The future of Section 2 depends 
not only on the direction of the judiciary but also on dynamic 
enforcement strategies. In times like these, we cannot afford to do 
less. 
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